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THE FORTNIGHTLY

JANUARY, 1952

THE A B C OF STRASBOURG

BY WILLIAM RYDAL

A CASUAL ENGLISH visitor to the 'House of Europe' at Strasbourg, as he strolls along the corridors adjacent to the Assembly Hall, may well stop short and smile when he observes on the door of one of the office-rooms the bilingual legend—"*Questeur—Serjeant-at-Arms*". The *questeurs* in the French Parliament are three members of the Bureau specially charged with the administrative and financial arrangements of their Chamber, whereas Strasbourg's "Serjeant-at-Arms", who happens to be an Italian, is an official exclusively concerned with questions of security and accommodation. This Westminster touch belongs to the parliamentary frills and furbelows with which the Consultative Assembly is decked. The Clerk of the Assembly (*Greffier*), now a high official of the Secretariat (Italian)—following the misconceived experiment in 1949 of importing Lord Campion (Sir Gilbert as he was then) from the House of Commons—is served, during the sessions of the Assembly, by a posse of Parliamentary officers, from London, Brussels and Paris, who are temporary members of the Council's Secretariat. Incidentally, the House of Commons clerks have, blithely, sought to introduce into the English terminology of this traditionless body the at times archaic idiom of our ancient legislature : for example, an amendment is not adopted but agreed to, it is not negatived (or rejected) but disagreed to ! Procedure, be it said, is emphatically more on Continental than British lines. Such Parliamentary excursions at all events mark the Strasbourg Assembly off distinctly from the international conference on the United Nations pattern.

The Consultative Assembly is, however, of course, not a Parliament in any real acceptation of the term ; there is no Government responsible to it, no administration over which it can exercise control ; nor, as far as one can see ahead, is it likely to acquire authentic parliamentary status. The Representatives from the 15 different countries, are indeed, with one or two exceptions, members of their national Parliaments ; but they have no mandate from their electors to 'speak European', they are representative only of a hypothetical European opinion. In the original blue print devised by the Committee for the Study of European Unity, there is believed to have been a suggestion that as many as a third or a quarter of the national team might be

chosen from outside Parliament. That the Representatives should be chosen *by* the various legislatures, on the other hand, has been established dogma all along on the Continent, to which, however, Britain's spokesmen vigorously demurred. The Statute, consequently, left the matter to the discretion of the Governments, and it is only recently that the Assembly has persuaded the Committee of Ministers to alter the text so as to give sanction to the original idea. There exists, after all, a fetishism about ' Parliament ' on the Continent no less than in Britain—only they are two different cults. One sometimes feels indeed that this difference between the conception of the rôle of Parliament held instinctively by the Englishman, on the one hand, and Continental democrats on the other, accounts for many of the difficulties under which the Council of Europe is labouring.

However that may be, it is as a would-be European Parliament, remember, that the Strasbourg areopagus made its bow to the world. The Council of Europe was indeed sired by the Foreign Ministers composing the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organization ; but its dam was the International Co-ordinating Committee of the Hague Congress, which, with a burning desire for the democratic process, in its zeal for European Union, in 1948, had hitched its waggon to the notion of a representative European Assembly. The assumption was that ' Free Europe ' could demand nothing less. And it was only under pressure from the more prudent national bureaucracies that this aspiration was whittled down to the more modest demand for a consultative or deliberative Assembly such as exists. The French and Belgian Governments, it may be recalled, in September 1948 sponsored the latter proposal.

The late Mr. Bevin, himself never a good House of Commons man, saw no good in such an unresponsible, not to say irresponsible, body. His mind was set upon inter-governmental collaboration for the achievement of Western Union, as in the Brussels Treaty Organization, the O.E.E.C. and the prospective Atlantic alliance, and he was prepared to accept no more than a Council of Ministers for Europe (for an experimental period of five years) which would in fact have been merely a segment of the United Nations organization. How the 18 sages of the advisory Committee in Paris contrived to marry these two disparate conceptions, and how Mr. Bevin's resistance was eventually overborne by his Brussels Treaty colleagues belongs to history. But it is certainly relevant now to recall that from the first the Committee of Ministers was regarded in the chancelleries as the senior, and effective, partner, and the Assembly, by which Strasbourg is known to the public at large, was looked upon by the policy-makers as, at best, wurzelflummery, at worst a positive nuisance which must not be allowed to interfere with the rotation of

the well-lubricated inter-governmental wheels.

The two bodies have now shaken down into a tolerable régime of co-existence, and the Chairman-in-office of the Committee of Ministers, M. Stikker, when he delivered his report to the Assembly last May, skilfully applied the balm in reminding his hearers that the growth of the European parliamentary democracies has been effected largely by the inter-play of two major elements, a charter plus unwritten parliamentary procedure, the inference being that Strasbourg, slowly but surely, would develop in the same way. But, in fact, there is no disposition now, on the part of the British Government, and those which take their cue from London, the three Scandinavian countries—and Ireland (*mirabile dictu*), any more than there was in 1949, to allow the Consultative Assembly to acquire legislative or executive powers. The Assembly, oddly enough, which would fain be a Parliament, and, in any case, has real value as a forum for discussion, has devoted most of its energies to constructing designs for a European Government! And the Ministers have consistently blocked the road with the reminder that contemporary forms of association of States, including the Council of Europe, leave responsibility where, at the present stage of development, it belongs—with the Governments of the individual States answerable to the national Parliaments. As Mr. Morrison observed when leading the Labour group of Representatives at the 1949 Assembly, the procedure of co-operation at Government level, of voluntary partnership in common tasks, is the only one for which any Government has a mandate from the electorate.

This background is essential to an understanding of the stubborn British resistance to the slap-happy enthusiasm of the Continental parliamentarians with their continual schemes for establishing, by recommendations and resolutions galore, a tightly-woven European polity. Not that Britain's spokesmen, up to now, have gone about their ' debunking ' job very tactfully ! The representatives of the Labour Government, having consistently missed their cue on the Strasbourg stage, because of insularity, on the one hand and, be it said, petty jealousy of Mr. Churchill, finally nailed their colours to the mast of ' external association ', that curious formula which Mr. de Valera invented as a solvent of Anglo-Irish difficulties. And, as we have seen at the Assembly which has just ended, the Conservative Government have found it impossible, as things are, to go beyond this formula. The difference is mainly one of temperature—as Mr. Boothby said, " a warm douche instead of a cold douche."

The recent meeting of the Consultative Assembly—the second part of the Third Session—was a perfect illustration of the moonbeam-chasing to which not a few Continental politicians, when they get to Strasbourg, are addicted. Because their mental training has been

grounded in *le droit* and half-baked political philosophy, and beca
of the strong federalist strain in the movement for 'Europe
Union', the French and Italian Representatives, in particular, per
in the attempt to create some sort of executive body for Europe wh
should over-ride national policies and considerations. 'Ki
Mackay, it may be recalled—thereby completely unrepresentative
the Labour Party (and of British opinion)—had contrived a year
a variant of this in his Protocol for the Amendment of the Statu
designed to confer on the Assembly law-making powers. The la
idea is a sort of combination of both proposals : the appointmen
High Commissioners for various spheres of activity by conventi
drawn up in Strasbourg even if applicable only to a limited num
of countries, as, for example, the six States that have participate
the conferences on the Schuman Plan and the European Ar
project. In fact, this motion of partial functional federation d
not prosper because, Britain having made her position crystal-cl
the very sponsors of the schemes for little Europe in the end run a
from them ; in plain language, France is unwilling to be left insi
cage with Germany. What these zealots for European Governm
do not appear to recognize is that even if a resolution to federate v
adopted unanimously by the Assembly at Strasbourg, there
remains the long and difficult task of convincing the parliament
the Member States that the resolution be accepted. There rem
the British difficulty, which is a very real one. M. Spaak and ot
were right enough in reiterating time and again that Britain is
terms of up-to-date strategy and economics, an integral part
Europe. The point is, however, that the concept of 'Europe'
the world of to-day, if it is to have any real meaning, must comp
the Continent *plus* Britain and the Commonwealth countries, if
the whole sterling area. The British, on the other hand, are righ
maintaining that federation, open or disguised, is not the only r
to European—or Atlantic—unity.

Yet in one main particular, of course, the British depreci
of Strasbourg are abundantly right—in their instinct that Eu
by itself, still less western Europe, is not a significant groupin
the world of to-day ; all the major problems have an 'Atla
or wider setting. It has taken the champions of 'European Un
in the context of Strasbourg over two years to realize this prime
essential fact. The main feature of the hurried First Part of the
Assembly in May, it may be recalled, was the proposal for a
discussion between members of the Assembly and members of
U.S. Congress. Lord Layton's mission to Washington bore f
and the talks only took place on November 19 and the follo
days, just a week before the opening of the Second Part of
year's Assembly.

A palaver of this kind, even so, suggests little more than a replica the kind of discussions that take place under the auspices of the ter-Parliamentary Union. In what, then, does the Consultative sembly differ from the latter ? In other words, given the hard t that the Committee of Ministers, whether we like it or not, is the wheel of the Council of Europe machinery, what exactly to-day er two and a half years, is meant by the Strasbourg gospel: " What the ' form ' ? "

* * * * *

The paramount need for the Pax Americana, for the acceptance of ited States leadership of the west, in the world as it is to-day, aks for itself. Without this " roof of security ", as Mr. Bevin led the Atlantic Treaty, no political structure in Europe, and tainly not the British Commonwealth of nations, could survive the ssure from the east. One by one the peoples of the Old World uld be succumbing to the siren voices of Communism. Britain's bour Government, for all the vituperation about Mr. Churchill's lton speech, perforce, clung to this life-line : it was precisely lack of a common Anglo-American policy that Britain fered the *débâcle* of Abadan. But, on the other hand, in the hearts l minds of all who live, move and have their being on this side of Atlantic ' there'll always be a Europe.' It should not have been to General Eisenhower (in his Independence Day speech) to claim that the union of Europe was essential not only as a bulwark inst Russia but to preserve European independence *vis-à-vis* erica.

Politics in the broadest and deepest sense—and it is, after all, as a itical challenge that Kremlinism has to be met and defeated—is in last analysis not a matter of military strategy or economic strength of psychological *élan*. And in that respect, let us admit, the my still has the advantage. It is unhappily true that the west, as hole lacks the spur of moral idealism, that *mystique*, as the French uld say, which alone can secure effective action and victory. nsciousness of Atlantic unity, among ordinary men and women ound to be a plant of slow growth. Thus, a certain *accidie* ndemic on the Continent, partly because of the appeal of mmunism itself to the ordinary man's yearning for peace and his ish impulses, partly because the social pattern lacks the coherence integration of Britain's Welfare State—and partly, be it said, ause of a certain inherent distrust of, and refractoriness towards, erican ways. The last is conspicuous, of course, in the case of nce, whose rôle remains decisive. Hence the moral necessity of European ' myth '.

For this reason alone the existence of the Council of Europe, and, cifically, the Consultative Assembly as a forum where the nations'

problems can be placed in their European setting, is in itself a most valuable asset, even though its activities might seem at present to contribute nothing to the sum total of actual achievement. (Sneers at another ' talking-shop ' are misplaced ; that is precisely what it is meant to be.) Here, in Strasbourg, is a noble nationalism-transcending cause to live and work, and, if necessary, die for, without which all the elaborate paraphernalia of NATO committees and paper planning are vain. When Mr. Churchill, in August 1950, introduced in the Consultative Assembly his motion for the creation of a ' European Army ' he gauged exactly what was the need of the hour. He made it clear in his speech that there was no question of proceeding without the full collaboration of the United States and Canada, no idea of undermining the Atlantic Treaty Organization. He was simply using the forum of Strasbourg to ventilate the popular dis-satisfaction and dismay concerning the actual military unpreparedness which the Korean crisis had floodlit. And he was at the same time testifying, in the presence of the first independent German delegation at a post-war conference, to the need for welding the German Federal Republic, in the most positive and concrete way, into the comity of the west. (The Schuman Plan, which had the same objective, was then no more than a project.) It was a triumph of psychology and timing, a shot in the arm which acted, for a time at any rate, as a very necessary tonic to the whole European body politic. Only party political myopia could have represented it as a " stunt ". Six weeks later, indeed, the Council of the Atlantic Treaty Organization itself in its blue print for integrated defence, set out on the course which had been charted. And, a year later, we had Mr. John Strachey blandly proclaiming that, after all, the French (who, of course, seized on the idea) were right. There was no other way of grappling with the German problem.

In the meantime, however, Britain's official spokesmen were busily engaged in contracting out of the ' making of Europe ', on one specious plea or another, only to be jolted back into line by the Americans themselves. Now, in deference to the British Government's susceptibilities, the formula, sponsored by the three Powers at their Washington meeting on September 14, was :

> the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a *continental* European community, which itself will form part of a constantly developing Atlantic community.

The new ' boss-word ' is community, as with the coal and steel pool with Britain on the side-lines.

Admittedly the British attitude towards European integration which is resented on the Continent and incomprehensible to America was never just a matter of Transport House ignorance and prejudice

Distrust of the Continent goes deep in the average Englishman and was reinforced in the present instance by the Labour Party dogma of ' no entanglements ' lest they involve interference with Britain's egalitarian ' national ' socialism—fair shares, full employment and all that. And one must certainly not underrate the effect of differing experience. In the quaint phrase employed by Labour's white-headed boy, Mr. Anthony Crosland, Britain " has avoided the despairing disillusionment with the nation-State" which the experience of invasion or defeat has brought about in the Continental countries.* That no country on this side of the Atlantic can stand alone, can call itself ' independent ' from the economic or defence point of view is in fact elementary realism. What does not follow is that—to borrow unkindly) Mr. Attlee's phrase of 1939 " Europe must *federate* or perish." The British at Strasbourg—and this applies to Conservative as well as Labour representatives—have made a valuable negative contribution in blowing away the froth of ' federation '. Why it should have ever been thought that this eighteenth-century device would be applicable to the political, economic and social conditions of to-day, passes the wit of man to comprehend. The only charitable explanation, which happens to be the right one, is that the zealots of European Union at Strasbourg who use the term do not mean what they say. Frenchmen, from M. Herriot downwards, will be found to use the term for the project of closer unity as loosely as did M. Briand in his original proposal for a United States of Europe at the League of Nations Assembly in 1929. (M. Schuman, in his pronouncement, last autumn, was just as much a sinner.). What is meant, presumably, is that it is up to European statesmanship, with its political maturity, by comparison with America, and its vastly more urgent need, to find some way of breaking with the conference system with its hallowed right of veto which is inherent in inter-governmental co-operation.

Let us see how this has worked out at the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers, in August 1949, consulted the Assembly on the question whether any changes might be necessary in the political structure of Europe to achieve greater unity. The answer it got, by a unanimous vote of the Assembly, was that the problems of common interest to the States of Europe could not be solved within the framework of the present structure ; and the Assembly went on to state that the aim and goal must be the creation of " a European political authority with limited functions but real powers." That is still to-day the pure milk of the Strasbourg gospel. The divergences have been, and are, on the methods and on the pace of development. To the ingenuous—or disingenuous—federal doctrine the British (and their Scandinavian satellites) opposed the ' functional ' approach.

* Article in *The Political Quarterly*, April-June, 1951.

When the latter had successfully routed the constitution-mong including the 'Little Europeans' who advocated going ahead w out Britain, two avenues were explored. All manner of suggesti were made for the revision of the Statute, on the one hand, and, the other hand, there was the plan for union by sectors or 'functic union' through a cluster of so-called specialized authorities on pattern of the Schuman Plan. Mr. Mackay's ambitious proto for the revision of the Statute has perished by the wayside, but notion of a supranational authority in this or that particular sp of common concern holds the field. Without any great enthusi the Committee of Ministers has given its blessing to the idea specialized authorities, and agreed in principle to another sugges of the Assembly for the conclusion of "partial agreements" among s but not all of the Members of the Council. It remains true that specialized authorities—for coal and steel, for a European Army, agriculture and for transport—are tending to develop outside Council, for the very good reason that the 'founding fathers' in t wisdom, in 1949, did not want mere parliamentarians, represen nobody but themselves, to concern themselves with the major is of economic policy and defence, to pry into the mysteries of O.E. and the Western Union or Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the political field is thus barred, mainly owing to the det ment of Britain, the principal activity of the committees of experts with the notable exception of the Convention for the Protectio Human Rights—in social, refugee and cultural questions or on t like the standardization of passports or a European postage st Failing attempts to secure convention-making powers for the Co and to endow it with executive functions in some shape or form efforts of the selected, not elected, parliamentarians at Strasb must necessarily be directed to developing the consultative funct of the Assembly (for, in fact, it is rarely if ever consulted by Ministers, who, naturally, prefer tame experts), to clarifying relationship of specialized authorities with the Council and, but by no means least, to bringing about a merger with the Co of the O.E.E.C. and what remains of the Brussels Treaty enterpri

Is the idea that existing inter-governmental collaboration ca made subject to democratic control through the Consult Assembly a will-o'-the-wisp? It is too early to say. What one can must, say in all honesty is that the control will not be by parliame process, properly speaking. Well-wishers of the unique pilot pr of 'European Union' at Strasbourg, may hope at any rate that it after two years, learn to eschew fiction and fancy and to concer upon the job that a body of this kind can do—which is to crea the several countries, through fulfilling its function as a forur effective 'European' climate of opinion.

ENGLAND AS AN EX-WORLD POWER

By J. H. Huizinga

JEAN Servan Schreiber has recently described Great Britain as "America's satellite *par excellence*", basing this unflattering characterization on his belief in John Bull's utter economic dependence on Uncle Sam. Possibly there is exaggeration in this view, but what can hardly be denied and is even beginning to be recognized in Britain itself is that this country is indeed no longer capable of independent action in the field of foreign policy. Recent events in Persia have demonstrated that only too clearly. For when it came to the point where the object of policy could only be achieved by falling back on the ultimate sanction of force, Britain could not decide independently whether the game was worth the candle that might only too easily have set the whole world aflame but had to abide by the judgment of Washington. That is to say, while she is still strong enough to defend her remaining positions of power by force, she is no longer strong enough to take the attitude of "damn the consequences". Wherever in our highly combustible world the sanction of force threatens to upset the international balance of power and hence to result in world war or even in a loss of territory in the cold war, Britain must obtain the consent of America which alone is strong enough to win such a war for her before she can safely resort to this *ultima ratio* of all foreign policy.

It is a strange paradox that because the British are still by far the strongest of America's European allies they are made to feel their dependence on Washington more frequently and acutely than any other member of the western community. Luxemburg, to take one of the smallest, hardly feels this dependence just because it has no imperial outposts whose defence raises questions of global strategy in which America must inevitably have the last word. The Belgians, too, rarely notice it. Like Britain they still have valuable overseas possessions but they are situated in a part of the world where the use of force to maintain the *status quo* carries little or no risk of disturbing the international balance of power and hence does not require the fiat of America. Britain's remaining strongholds abroad, however, are not only far more numerous than those of any other European nation but are also at least partly located in that no-man's-land between the eastern and the western world where a military or even a

false diplomatic move might only too easily upset the balance of power, and hence is of the greatest concern to the Americans who will have to bear the lion's share of the consequences.

Naturally the British find it difficult to adjust themselves to this situation. Intellectually they cannot escape the recognition that they have lost their autonomy in foreign policy, as the *Economist* has boldly expressed it. Emotionally they constantly rebel against it. It is a conflict between the head and the heart which manifests itself in many different ways. Sometimes it finds expression in the words of one and the same person. Thus the *Spectator* recently admitted that British power "was not what it used to be" only to deny vehemently in the next sentence "the idea, grown up East and West of Suez, that the day of Britain's greatness is past ; false as it is, its falsity must be demonstrated." Even Mr. Churchill occasionally betrays a similar self-contradictory spirit. It is perhaps one of the greatest merits of this super-patriot that he has done more than any other Englishman to open the people's eyes to the tragic fact of their "finest hour" having proved their last as a world power. Yet he, too, sometimes seeks to escape from this painful recognition of England's decline as was the case this summer when he attributed the liberties which Egypt, Persia, Albania, Argentine and Chile have dared to take with the British Lion to ". . . Mr. Attlee's attempt to impose doctrinaire socialism on this country." Mr. Morrison, now that he is free to speak his mind, or rather his heart, vents his feelings by warning the new Government not to be too subservient to America and asking for the moon—"a relationship with the U.S. based on discussions between . . . political equals." And Mr. Morrison was not the only one who voiced concern at Britain's growing dependence on America during the recent debate on foreign affairs. There were many others equally unwilling to resign themselves to the facts of international life. Thus Lord Halifax, who blandly assured Mr. Morrison that there was no need to worry since the relationship between the U.S. and Britain was one of "recognized partnership" of mutual value. Thus the Socialist Mr. Craddock, who equated America's material superiority with Britain's "tremendous experience and wisdom in political matters" and seemed to think that the latter was sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of Mr. Morrison's demand for a relationship of "political equals". Thus the Conservative Captain Pilkington, who felt that Britain could claim not only equality but leadership "because after all it is quality and not quantity that counts, it is will power and determination and not the possession of guns and butter." Thus the Bevanites, whose resentment of Britain's dependence on her American ally leads them to to propound the strange theory that it can be lessened by equipping the nation with teeth and spectacles rather than with arms paid for

by American dollars, as if by some mysterious process military weakness would prove a source of diplomatic strength in the counsels of the western coalition.

There are many other examples of such outbursts of emotional rebellion against the will of history. Think of the numerous leading Conservatives and other prominent Englishmen whose proud British hearts so clearly got the better of their cool British heads when they demanded military intervention in the Persian powder keg regardless of the American veto. The present Minister of War, Brigadier Head, the present Minister of Supply, Duncan Sandys, the Leader of the Tory Party in the Lords, the Marquess of Salisbury, the former ambassador in Paris, Sir Duff Cooper, the former Foreign Office Chief, Sir Robert Vansittart—all of them at that time adopted, though some more explicitly than others, the " damn the consequences " attitude and were supported in this by numerous newspapers including, towards the end, even *The Times*. No more typical expression of their feelings than the *cri de coeur* of the Conservative writer Malcolm Muggeridge who exclaimed in the *Daily Telegraph* : " Have we sunk so low in the world that we are no longer capable of action on our own account ? " Sometimes, too, these rebellious feelings express themselves in outbursts of violent world-embracing xenophobia of which Lord Beaverbrook's mass-circulation paper, the *Sunday Express*, afforded a striking example some weeks ago when it denounced the UN as " a collection of jackals . . . who have hated us for years because of our strength . . . who have been consumed with envy because of the wideness of our possessions . . . and who have but one common desire, the destruction of the prestige and power of Britain."

Other instances of this resentment are to be found in the scornful denigration of specific representatives of those " lesser breeds without the law " who now dare to challenge Britain. Thus the highly respected historian Arthur Bryant, who recently wrote of the " lying, fraud, ill-faith, tyranny and hatred of those ruling lands who have ceased to fear England's age-long watch for freedom and justice." Thus, too, ex-Minister Richard Stokes's contemptuous reference to Dr. Mossadeq as a man " who could not even manage a sweet shop." Thus, the *Spectator's* explanation of the Egyptian Premier's nationalism as due to his being " a tired old man, who finds consolation for his old age only in the applause of the Cairo mob."

Such are the many different forms in which the emotional resistance against the intellectual recognition of England's loss of autonomy in foreign affairs expresses itself. " The contemporary world ", so one of the most clear-sighted Sunday papers has put it with that same courage in facing facts which the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Economist*, too, have frequently displayed, " is American-led and

American-centred, but many of our habits and policies are still geared to a British-centred and British-led world in which we can call the tune to suit ourselves."

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It is a curious fact that in spite of this growing though unwilling recognition of Britain's loss of stature, the fundamental conception dominating nearly all British thinking about foreign policy still seems to be that of an Atlantic community resting on three pillars, the U.S., the Commonwealth and Europe. Nobody questions whether the underlying assumption of this Churchillian conception is still valid. But is it not possible that Britain might find herself in a better position to gain indispensable American support for the defence of the west's remaining and largely European-controlled outposts in the no-man's-land of the Middle East, Asia and Africa if she spoke as the leader of a United Europe rather than as the leader of a Commonwealth club, some of whose strategically and numerically most important members will play-act but not really play ?

Is the British pillar really still strong enough to stand alone ? To the continental eye it sometimes looks as if the British realize in their heart of hearts that the answer might be in the negative but cannot bring themselves to admit it. For it is a fact that every time there has been a Continental initiative aiming at the gradual translation into reality of Mr. Churchill's professed desire for the construction of a European pillar next to the British one, the immediate and practically unanimous reaction in this country has ranged all the way from polite scepticism to outright hostility. Is this because of a sincere intellectual conviction that it cannot be done ? Or is it at least partly because of a subconscious feeling that it should not be done since a European pillar, that really was a pillar, might well overshadow the British one ?

Whatever the answer, most people in this country still seem to take it for granted that the British Commonwealth remains a world power well able to stand on its own legs. In some respects this attitude seems rather like that maintained, even quite recently, by the Liberal Party in Britain's domestic politics. It is a sufficiently illuminating parallel to merit some elaboration. Just as the Liberals were the most powerful party in the State some 50 years ago so the British were the strongest power on the global scene. And just as the Liberals have since then gradually lost by far the greatest part of their supporters when their working-class following left to set up for themselves as the Labour Party, so the British party has seen its membership dwindle, as the Asiatic masses founded their own independent parties. To be sure, the Indian and Pakistani parties—unlike the Irish and the Burmese—still call themselves members of

the British party. But as they no longer take the British Whip nor contribute to the party's battle-chest their nominal support is of no greater and more lasting value than the support of the Irish Party was to the Liberals. As for Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, though their hearts are doubtless still with the British party their heads and stomachs compel them to rely increasingly on the American party and hence to take the American rather than the British Whip. It would doubtless be going too far to say that they have imitated the example of those Liberals who joined the strongest party in 1931. But that the trend is in that direction can hardly be denied. Besides, how many of them are there ? In Australia and New Zealand no more than the population of London, in South Africa more than half of whose whites can certainly not be said to take the British Whip, just about a million, in Canada which has gone farthest in following the National Liberal example, 13 million. It does not add up to a world power even when the remaining colonies, whose population is less than that of the recently demised Dutch Empire, are included.

Like the Liberal Party at home, therefore, the British party in the world is now only a shadow of its former self. But just as the Liberals are still refusing to acknowledge that they are played out so the British often seem to cling to the dream of recovering their former status as a world power. And therein lies perhaps at least a partial explanation for the British refusal to make common cause with the European splinter-parties in the western coalition, some of whom —like France and Belgium—have much the same special interests to defend, and try to gain the leadership of a united European party. Such a block would have a far larger though admittedly poorer " following in the country " than the American party which now dominates the coalition and would obviously speak with a far more powerful voice than that of its separate national components. There seems to be no question, moreover, of the present leader of the coalition vetoing such a " ganging up " as a potential threat to his leadership. On the contrary, with truly reckless generosity he has done everything in his power to encourage the formation of a united European party. Why then will the British have nothing to do with it ? At least partly, I would suggest (there are other reasons of course), because of their inability or reluctance to face the facts of their own party's loss of world power status rather like the unwillingness of the Liberal Party even now to recognize that its days of power are over.

There is one great difference, however, between the position of the British party in the world and that of the Liberal Party at Westminster. The latter have maintained their independence of action, the former have not. Unlike the Liberals who have refused to take the Tory

Whip in exchange for support on the electoral battlefield, the greatly weakened British party " in the Parliament of Man " has felt compelled to take the American Whip in exchange for support on the military and financial battlefield. The inevitable consequence, of course, is that this British party has forfeited the only really effective means of bringing pressure to bear on the American party, the threat of voting—or fighting—with the other side. However small Mr. Davies's party, the Liberal leader can wield this threat with considerable effect. So—as recent events have proved—can Dr. Mossadeq, the leader of another tiny splinter party that has preserved its bargaining or blackmailing power by staying on the fence. But however large John Bull's party, as long as he dare not detach it from the American-led coalition he can no more hope to threaten its leader into accepting his views than the National Liberals can hope to pressurize Mr. Churchill. He can only try to persuade, knowing that he has nothing to fall back upon, if sweet reason should fail to convince, except the suicidal threat to cross the floor.

It seems a painful situation, especially for such a proud and once all-powerful party as the British. And that makes it all the more curious that the obvious palliative—remedy would be too strong a word—is hardly ever even discussed and that the questions arising out of such a discussion are hardly ever raised. Is the underlying assumption of the Churchillian conception still valid ? Will the British voice really carry most weight in the coalition headquarters at Washington by continuing to speak for a group which is not a disciplined party at all but only an " old boys' association " ? Would Britain's interests not be better served by trying to gain the leadership of the European party that is slowly but surely coming into being ? Might not the sacrifice of sovereignty involved in such a course be more than compensated by the gain of influence where it really counts : in Washington ? Has not the Persian episode proved that the independence of action to which sovereign Britain so stubbornly clings is purely illusory ? There may be a thousand good reasons—I can think of a few myself—why the answer to these questions should turn out to be : ' A thousand times no.' But it is difficult to find a single good reason why they should never even get asked.

(*The author is the London Correspondent of the* Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant.)

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSERVATIVE VICTORY

By T. E. Utley

NO amount of statistical interpretation of the General Election result can avert the conclusion that it reveals a closer correspondence between political opinion and social class than is sual in Britain. It is true that the swing towards the Right was bout the same in predominantly working-class constituencies as it as in rural and middle-class areas, but this merely shows that the oating voter, who is in any case a rare phenomenon, is no rarer in ne class than in another. It does not alter the fact that the majority f wage-earners obviously voted Socialist, whereas that section of the iddle classes which is concentrated mainly in suburban constiencies and in the country voted Conservative. Since this has now appened in two successive general elections the inference that ritain may be entering on a prolonged period of organized class onflict, reflecting itself in an almost equal division of power between e two main parties in the Commons, is tempting if not irresistible.

Against this it has been argued that the election shows nothing cept the truth of the old generalization that opinion in Britain anges very slowly, but when a sudden swing does take place its sults are never stable, and that when two general elections occur on after each other, they almost always produce the same sults. At least one famous precedent seems to support this eory. The immense Liberal majority of 1906 sank heavily in 1910, d the position of parties remained almost unaltered in the election 1911. The parallel however is not exact. There is absolutely no ason for regarding the Labour victory of 1945 as the consequence a sudden flight of popular fancy. On the contrary, there are many asons for regarding it as the cumulative effect of a natural reaction ainst a period of Conservative ascendancy which had been artificially olonged by war. Had there been a general election in 1940, as in e ordinary course of things there would have been, it would almost rtainly have narrowed the gap between Conservative and Labour the Commons. As it was, the factors making for a swing towards e Left were still further intensified by the war, and the impossibility expelling an administration elected in 1935, a year which belonged a totally different epoch from the 1940's, confirmed the tendency. was the election of 1950, not that of 1945, which showed a sudden

change of opinion, and that change, far from proving unstable, was maintained in the last election. Whatever is happening is not to be explained in terms of a regular oscillation of party fortunes. For one reason or another, the two-party system, which was always supposed to ensure the automatic return of a government strong enough to govern and sufficiently representative of all classes to enable it to deliver the country for five years from the strain of acute party conflict, had failed to do these things. The influence of social and economic factors on voting may or may not decline. The present close balance of forces is no doubt due in part to other than social causes. It is often forgotten, for example, that in order to work with perfect efficiency the two-party system demands the existence of a third party, always knocking at the gates just hard enough to discomfort one of the privileged parties within but not strong enough to force an entry. Under the British constitution the function of a third party is to split votes. That the Liberals failed to do this effectively in 1950 is proved by the relatively small difference which the disappearance of so many of their candidates made in 1951. The existence of a respectably strong third party is almost certain to operate to the disadvantage of one of the main parties and to the advantage of the other, and at a time when the country is fairly evenly divided between Right and Left it helps to prevent that equal division from being reflected in the Commons. The last two elections revealed, however, that the electorate now holds third parties in contempt, and it is no longer possible to look to such a party to be a serious factor either in Parliament or in the constituencies. Furthermore, both the main parties are now so thoroughly disciplined that the possibility of a House of Commons which finds itself in a state of deadlock providing a secure administration through the re-grouping of Members inside the House has been practically banished. The only hope, therefore, of achieving a really strong Government is for one of the parties to gain a decisive majority of votes. Since the evidence suggests that voting is now following pre-determined class lines the hope is not strong.

At all times incomes and social status have influenced opinion, and never more than in the nineteenth century, the classic age of party government ; but the relationship between them was less rigid than it is now, and the nation's class structure was far more complex. The division between the propertied and the propertyless, for example, was complicated by the simultaneous conflict between town and country. The alliance which nineteenth-century Toryism was always trying to perfect between the Tory squirearchy and the urban workers against Liberal manufacturers is an instance of how the vertical divisions of society were often more important than its horizontal divisions. Religion, in the shape of the traditional enmity between

Anglicans and Nonconformists, was also a powerful factor in elections. All this left the political parties a great deal of scope for manoeuvre. New social and political alliances were always possible, and the danger of the community ranging itself in two opposite and equal alliances was never very real. It is with this danger that both parties, and more conspicuously the Conservatives, have now to contend. It is for the Conservatives to use the slender and fleeting opportunity provided by their victory to win some working-class adherents and thereby make it necessary for Labour to abandon its reliance on the unreflecting loyalty of its working-class supporters.

It is clear that Mr. Churchill has all this in mind. The conflict which has been going on inside the Conservative Party since 1945 between those who, led and epitomized by Mr. Butler, have based their views on the assumption that the welfare State has come to stay, and those who hoped to return to power on Mr. Churchill's slogan about setting the people free, has ended in an unqualified victory for Mr. Butler. His appointment to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer is merely the confirmation of that victory. After only a month of Tory rule it is obvious that there is no likelihood of the sudden abandonment of Labour's planning technique, or the indiscriminate dismantling of the machinery through which it was exercised. The objects of housing policy, for example, have changed, the emphasis having shifted from the importance of ensuring exact quality of treatment for the applicants for houses, to the importance of actually building houses, but the administrative methods to be used remain the same. So far the Conservative Government have tried to present themselves not as the purveyor of a new policy but as a body of expert administrators coming fresh to a task which has been too long in the hands of hide-bound theoreticians. That is certainly the impression intended to be conveyed by Mr. Churchill's reorganization of the Cabinet. It may be doubted whether the appointment of Lord Woolton to co-ordinate the activities of only two Government departments will tend to efficiency, but the appearance of such Ministers, with vague overall powers is plainly meant to suggest that the age of talking is ended and the age of deeds begun. Similarly, Mr. Butler's speech in the debate on the Address presented him in the rôle of an experienced surgeon rescuing a dying patient from the attentions of a class of medical students mainly interested in the theory of their subject. All along the line the emphasis has been on administrative efficiency uninhibited by doctrine.

To this rule there is one outstanding and crucial exception, the fiscal measures which the Government have taken to reduce the rate of the nation's progress towards bankruptcy. Public opinion is still very confused about the nature of Britain's economic problem. It tends to think of economic policy in terms of a choice between

toughness and leniency, and to put such widely different measures as a reduction in the food ration and a withdrawal of food subsidies in the same category. But the choice is really between two different kinds of toughness. The immediate task facing any British Government must be to divert a large part of the nation's resources of material and manpower to the production of armaments and exports, and to bring about a corresponding reduction in the demands of the home market, and there are, broadly speaking, two methods by which this can be done, either a drastic extension of physical controls or a substantial lessening of State interference. At present the whole machinery of State intervention is being used to obscure realities. Subsidies conceal shortages which would otherwise be reflected in higher prices and by so doing release money for forms of expenditure which the nation cannot afford. Inflated wages conceal, and by concealing accelerate, the advance towards bankruptcy. Rigorous State planning directed to the proper ends, however, would not have this effect. If Labour had planned more ruthlessly its economic policy would have been more successful, but its planning contained one fatal flaw. It was unable, through its dependence on the trade unions, to control what Socialist theory rightly holds to be the most important of all commodities, labour itself. A national wages policy, even without recourse to direction of labour, would have done something to prevent the worst effects of inflation, and to deflect labour into the channels where it is most needed. Price control without wage control, on the other hand, is a veritable recipe for inflation.

The new Government will certainly not conduct their campaign against inflation by means of direct controls. Their strategy will be to reduce rather than increase State direction, to allow economic facts to speak for themselves rather than to compel the people by ordinance to respect them. The attempt has already started in the raising of the bank rate by a half per cent. This must be followed by more drastic and more unpopular measures. The question, successfully avoided during the election campaign, of how public expenditure is to be cut without reducing the social services is still unanswered, and the still more critical question of how resources are to be diverted from home production to armaments and exports without causing temporary unemployment also remains to be answered.

The Government have forsworn radical deflation. They have accepted the concept of the welfare State as every party must, and with it the responsibility for maintaining constant supervision of the national economy. But within these limits they must seek, by judicious restraint on government action rather than by increasing it, to restore some of the incentives of a free economy, and in so doing they will inevitably restore some of the risks and even some of the positive evils of a free economy. If these risks and evils are to be

voided it can only be by substituting the disadvantages of a horoughly planned economy, disadvantages which the Labour arty shrank from imposing. Britain might overcome her crisis ither by leaning a good deal further towards the Left or by leaning ather more towards the Right than the Conservatives have so far nvisaged. The one thing she cannot do is not to move at all. arliamentary democracy always obscures the truth that politics is a hoice of evils, and the Government's supreme task is to drive that ruth home. In approaching that task they will be constantly andicapped by the knowledge that every move in the direction of conomy, every instance of unemployment, every decline in the ation's standard of life, will be attributed by half the electorate to a eliberate attempt to revert to the bad old days. Consideration of arty strategy will always tend to hold the Government back, but ven on a short and purely sectarian view timidity will not pay, for if he necessary measures are not taken the nation's standard of life will ontinue to decline until catastrophe in the form of mass unemploy- ent and universal poverty supervenes. The lesson to be taught that there is a real choice in politics, a choice between having rather ore freedom and rather less security, and rather less security and ther more freedom. Up to a point the best of both worlds can be mbined, but the point was reached long ago.

JAPAN : ASSET OR LIABILITY

By Marc T. Greene

THE West's need of Japan in the present critical Far Easter position is admittedly great, and none is more aware of tha than Japan herself. But the question of whether, in he regained power and restored pride, she will be a good workin partner against the Russian endeavour to control the Far Eas inevitably accompanies the conclusion of the liberal, American devised, Peace Treaty. Is this too liberal ? Will it revive pre-wa Japanese chauvinism ? Will its economic terms prove a hardshi to other nations trading with the Orient, especially Britain ? Wha we have yielded both politically and economically is too clear to b overlooked by anybody. In effect, we have made an ally of a lat foe without sufficient assurance that she will remain an ally.

From the point of view of the West the greatest uncertainty of th future is Japanese rearmament. And from the point of view o Britain in particular additional uncertainty arises over a rehabilitate Japanese textile industry and the English export trade in cotton good The Peace Treaty removes the limit of 400,000,000 spindles upo Japanese manufacturers and permits them to expand as they can an will, perhaps even beyond the three times this figure of pre-war days

War strength and potential of course rest upon economics. An an improved economic condition must inevitably stimulate Japane assurance towards the West, the " cockiness " so manifest to a foreigners in Japan during the decade before the war. Already th Japanese state of mind is : " They cannot get along without u therefore we can force them to yield even more than they have done

At the close of the war the West, especially America, was face with the problem of an impoverished, despairing, hopeless Japan, condition that encouraged radicalism under whatever name and which radicalism was already making dangerous progress. At a costs this had to be countered. As General MacArthur said to th writer, in Tokyo, a couple of years ago : " We had to save th Japanese or kill them." That is to say, lift them from their physic and psychological slough, or else either let them starve or shoot the if they turned to Russia. From a view-point of expedience, not le than of humanitarianism, they had to be saved. They were : a degree far beyond their utmost expectations. The peasant

ecame better fed, more economically secure, than at any time in apanese history. Industrial workers became acquainted with omforts never before known. To create an impression of friendliess so as to secure Japanese favour on our side, hundreds of war risoners were released, and thousands were " purged ".

But more than that, the " MacArthur policy " was to restore power nd influence to Japanese commercial, industrial and financial aders in measure that has amounted to a complete resurrection of ie notorious Zaibatsu, which is, in effect, a nation-wide cartel. othing has changed the established " MacArthur policy " ; its fect and influence were not linked to the continued presence of the ntroversial soldier in Japan. And one of his last official acts, a w weeks before the General's dismissal, was to issue a call for apanese military re-armament.

Now Japanese re-armament poses more than one question, and ises not a few doubts. Britain and the British Dominions, pecially Australia and New Zealand, can only contemplate with arm but one more lamentable proof that the world must maintain elf more or less in the form of one armed camp against another. eneral MacArthur at no time either favoured implementing the alta and Cairo declarations on Japanese militarism in their entirety, r even demolished the Japanese army or actually dissolved the panese General Staff. He went so far as to suggest the use of panese in a " reformed " Japanese army to be officered by Americans. recisely what a " reformed " army is was not explained.

The reorganization and rehabilitation of the Japanese military tablishment as planned and commenced by him has progressed aterially since his recall by President Truman. But even that not the greatest danger and uncertainty. Who can view other than th alarm the fact that (as in Germany) control of that establishment undoubtedly not only getting back into the hands of the same oup, or their descendants, who organized and commenced the cific war, but that it is being largely financed by the aforesaid ibatsu ? And the notion that re-arming Japan holds no danger as ng as she is a willing ally of the West and " does as she is told " is gularly naïve in view of the fact that such people as the powerful atoyama, once considered by many the real power in Japan, is hong the " purged " and again influential. Significantly, too, the panese National Youth Salvation Party—jingoistic as any of the azi youth organizations in Germany a dozen years ago—declaims out a " third world war exhausting both the West and Russia," hereupon Japan will be able to " establish herself " in Asia " and the world."

We must not, then, in our uncertainty over the political and nomic effects of the Peace Treaty, overlook its psychological effects.

These are of particular significance with a people like the Japanese. Everyone who has been in Japan since the war must have been struck both with the exceeding generosity of the American treatment of the late enemy and with his reactions to it. That generosity by no means excluded the social aspect ; in this connection it is notable that more than 1,400 American soldiers have married Japanese girls. Few social distinctions have existed between conquerors and conquered. Japanese deputations of all kinds, from newspaper editors to diplomats have visited America, and continue to, being treated there exactly as such were before the war. In fact, as one observant visitor whimsically put it, each side seems to be assuring the other that it is sorry " the whole thing happened, and anxious to forget it."

The Japanese response to this is naturally one of renewed self-confidence, conviction that defeat was some inexplicable kind of mis-chance, certainly that restoration of the *status quo ante* is now only a matter of time, and secret hope that the ultimate hegemony of the East is not an impossibility after all. To achieve this, however, it is obviously necessary to restore the strong export-trade position of pre-war years, when Japanese travelling salesmen were penetrating into the remotest corners of, not only Asia, but East, Central and South Africa, and even Australasia. As a result you could purchase bicycles for a couple of pounds in Uganda, cameras for a couple of shillings in Samoa, and fountain-pens for even less in Bangkok. Indeed, Japanese trade was especially flourishing in Siam, while her textiles and rubber goods were cutting seriously into English exports to Ceylon and New Zealand. It is a mistake, too, to suppose that all these goods were " shoddy " as has been claimed. The bicycles would run enduringly. The " two-bob " cameras would actually take pictures and the " one-bob " pens would really write. Similarly the rubber soled " tennis shoes " would wear as well as British goods at twice their cost.

All this the Japanese have every expectation of bringing to pass again ; there seems no reason why they should not. That is the spectre that is haunting the dreams of Lancashire, and other places. Nor was there ever any evidence that, in Australia for example, strong Anti-Japanese sentiment kept anybody from buying low-priced Japanese goods. It is apt to be the case that, when ideologic and economic considerations conflict, the latter is more likely than not to win. Already the Japanese textile industry has achieved a remarkable recovery, even without the benefit of the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Though total textile production amounts currently to only half that of 15 years ago, most people will be surprised to learn that overall industrial production is some 40 per cent. higher than at that time. Between 1949 and the summer of 1951 Japanese total manufacturing production advanced from 75 per cent. of 1935's

140 per cent. of it. Raw silk fell off and continues to, because of the increase in rayon production, but as to that, the Japanese rayon output went from 16,000,000 square yards three years ago to nearly 55,000,000 in the year just ended. The value of the total textile exports increased from 163,000,000 American dollars to 235,000,000 in less than a single year. Japan has already benefited by more than 300,000,000 dollars' worth of " procurement " orders in Korea, and the expectation is that when hostilities cease there and rehabilitation is in order it will be strongly to Japan's economic advantage. Japanese exporters also foresee in such event a resumption of trade to China, cotton-goods and machinery to be exchanged for coal, rice, soya-beans and oils.

To all this the Peace Treaty contains no preventive and few, if any, restrictive provisions. So that Japanese manufacturers not only have high hopes of equalling, if not exceeding, pre-war exports in cotton cloth, but even of restoring some of the trade in raw silks, seeing that even under occupation restrictions 100,000 bales were exported last year. (In 1934, the best year, the export of raw silk reached over half a million bales.) Of this 100,000, last year the United Kingdom took 11,000 and nearly 50,000 went to the United States.

No longer supporting a war machine, no longer put to the huge expenses of the other leading nations for creating and maintaining enormous defence forces and agencies, everything favours a future of sound and prosperous economy for a Japan that only half a dozen years ago was deep in the slough of impoverishment, wretchedness and despair. The American idea of rehabilitating Far Eastern economy by making Japan the " factory of Asia " and thus, in 1948, discontinuing the dismantling of Japanese factories for reparations, was not, of course, taken kindly by countries that had suffered at her hands ; especially the Philippines which really signed the Peace Treaty, as it were under protests and still ask for reparations, or by Australia which had long been a " dumping-ground " of Japanese cheap export production. Yet despite high duties America herself imported more than 400 millions of dollars' worth of everything, from raw silk and canned tunafish to scrap steel and toys, in 1951.

The Peace Treaty fixed no limits of any kind on anything, from increase of exports to increase of armed forces. Whether the Japanese themselves will bear the cost of the continuance of Allied soldiers in the country is yet to be decided, but " indirectly " America will bear much of it through the cost of maintenance of the various bases. These, moreover, will employ many Japanese, purchase Japanese production, and contribute to the country's economy in other ways. Yet it is certain that, as the Japanese increase in prosperity, expand their military strength and feel their renewed power

generally again, a clamour will arise for the withdrawal of all foreign military contingents.

The conditions of Japanese production, while an improvement over those of pre-war, are still such as to cause concern among other exporting countries. On the basis of a 48-hour week the general wage runs from the equivalent of £7 10s. 0d. a month to a third more. Working conditions are greatly improved. For example, there is no more sleeping among machines, a notorious pre-war abuse ; also ended is the tyranny, moral as well as physical, of foremen, overseers and the like. Consequently the worker is more contented and more enthusiastic in his labour, and therefore likely to speed up his output. His cost of living, of course, is far lower than in Western countries, so that his wage has more purchasing power than might be thought possible.

" One of the greatest assets in opening up existing resources in Japan," said the head of Mitsubishi not long ago, " is the abundant supply of labour provided by the dense and increasing population " (the increase is more than 1,500,000 annually). " The natural resources are thus supplemented by the human element in a most remarkable manner." Remarkable in Japan, and productive of apprehension elsewhere. But in Japan itself there is grave danger because of a rice shortage, a danger becoming apparent throughout the entire East. Japan, moreover, must import heavily and the main exporting countries, Siam, Indo-China and Burma, are full of their own trouble, especially the last two. Indo-China is now exporting no more than 100,000 tons of rice a year, as against 1,150,000 pre-war. This, of course, links up with the rice problem in the whole of the Orient, which is the problem of production lagging far behind the needs of an ever-increasing population.

But given the necessary conditions in sources of supply and potential markets, there are three elements of economic production that give Japan an advantageously competitive position in world trade : an abundance of cheap and skilled labour, a relatively well developed industrial establishment, and a key position on the North Pacific shipping routes—practically the same trade advantages which Britain exploited successfully in the early nineteenth century.

On the cultural side there is perhaps some significance in the astonishing " come-back " of Shintoism. Though the loss of the war blasted Japanese claims to " divinity " of racial origin and so forth and the renunciation by the Emperor of his own personal divinity together with the S.C.A. abolition of national financial assistance to Shinto shrines, appeared at the time to consign Shintoism to oblivion it has survived all these and other shocks and to-day its adherents are said to number 42,000,000, out of the Japanese population of twice that. This revival is largely due to the energy and determination

of the Shinto priests who, meek and humble during the ultra-militarist régime, immediately after the war inaugurated a campaign of amazing activity, for the first time taking their faith to the people instead of sitting in their cubicles and letting the people come to them. Perhaps the real significance of this is that, inasmuch as Shintoism is more a belief in race and nation, a kind of super-patriotism than strictly a religion, a revival of it on such a scale connotes a renewal of faith in that race and nation, a revived confidence in their destiny, and a reborn determination to make them powerful.

It is certain that, in any case, the new Japan, whose birth is coincident with the granting of one of the most generous peace treaties to a conquered people in all history, holds every potentiality for becoming a valuable—perhaps an invaluable—asset to the West in the endeavour to contain Soviet Russia in the Orient. On the other hand, what with the amazing amount of aid it has had in the few years since and the Peace Treaty's " green light " for it to go ahead full speed in every respect, there is the possibility of a restoration of strength and power that will imbue the Japanese people with something of the old dangerous arrogance.

(*The author, an American, has recently returned from another visit to Japan. He was formerly a special correspondent to both the military and civilian branches of the Occupation Authority there.*)

THE BRITISH PROTECTORATES IN AFRICA—II

By A. Sillery

THE relations between the British-administered Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and the Union of South Africa were discussed in the first part of this article*, and reasons were given why the British Government should resist any demand that the three territories should be handed over to the Union. The people are strenuously opposed to the idea of transfer, the continuance of British protection is a matter of honour, and any surrender would have serious consequences in the rest of our colonial empire.

While it is vital that Great Britain should retain control it is also important that there should be no complacency about our stewardship. Are our systems and methods of administration the best that can be devised ? Are we doing the best we can for the people who so confidingly put themselves in our charge ? Have we developed, or are we developing these territories to the best advantage of their inhabitants and of the empire in general ?

The Protectorates are governed by the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in South Africa, who therefore combines the function of Governor of these quasi-colonies with that of British Ambassador to the Union. Under him he has a Resident Commissioner in each Protectorate, who is now invariably recruited from the colonial service. The Resident Commissioner is assisted by a staff comparable to that of any small African dependency.

When the Colonial Office was divided into two in 1926, and the Dominions Office was formed to deal with the affairs of the self-governing countries of the empire, one might have expected that the Protectorates would remain under the Colonial Office. Instead they were placed under the Dominions Office and thus it is that they are the responsibility of the Minister for Commonwealth Relations.

The organization within which the Protectorates fall has been attacked on several grounds. First it is said that it is a mistake to keep them under the Commonwealth Relations Office which has no interest in colonial territories and no qualifications for governing them. There must therefore be neglect and inefficiency, and the Protectorates are deprived of the expert services that the Colonial

* The Fortnightly, December 1951

Office can mobilize and dispense. It is quite true that the British Government took on the Protectorates in a spirit of very limited responsibility, and more than once tried to palm them off on to someone else. When finally they fell back into Britain's lap, there was no idea that there should be any more than a kind of remote control involving as little trouble and expense as possible. In the last generation there has been a change and the charge of stagnation is no longer valid, however well-founded it may have been in the past. The C.R.O. has a special department which devotes itself to Protectorate affairs, which works in close co-operation with the Colonial Office and which has lately shown much activity. From the practical point of view it is doubtful whether the Protectorates suffer in comparison with other colonies. They have, for instance, received a good share of the Colonial Development Fund, and the Colonial Development Corporation is taking an interest in Swaziland and Bechuanaland ; recruits to the service, where possible, come from the common pool, and the Protectorate governments are kept well up-to-date with new policies and directives.

The second criticism is more serious and more difficult to refute ; it is that the C.R.O. and the High Commissioner, who both have the duty of maintaining good relations with South Africa, are prone to sacrifice the interests of the Protectorates when these conflict with South African policy. It is a criticism not lightly to be dismissed. The antinomy is not so great in Whitehall, where there is opportunity for consultation with the Colonial Office at all levels. But the High Commissioner's office has no such external corrective and is therefore in real danger of falling away from the principles that Great Britain has set herself in her dealings with her African dependencies. Apart from the question of principle there is also that of efficiency. The amount that the Resident Commissioners have to refer to the High Commissioner and he in his turn to the C.R.O. is staggering. Add to this the advent of the Nationalist Government in South Africa, which has greatly increased the diplomatic side of the High Commissioner's duties, and it will readily be seen that he has not enough time to apply himself to Protectorate affairs in the way he should.

It is true that a too rigid adherence to British principles of government, in the face of strong South African opposition, might do material harm to the Protectorates. They are so dependent economically on their powerful neighbour that a break with the Union might cause grave deprivations to their inhabitants. It must also be remembered that the position of High Commissioner is one of great prestige and that the holder of that office is more likely to be successful in negotiations with the Union than an administrator who was not also High Commissioner would be. In spite of these arguments it still seems that the High Commissioner's two functions are so

antithetic that it is impossible for one man conscientiously to carry them out.

A third criticism is that the person usually chosen to be High Commissioner is not always, or even often, a colonial specialist and is therefore not qualified to administer Africans. This argument has little weight. In general the High Commissioner only deals with high policy and is in any case advised by Resident Commissioners and a competent Chief Secretary ; one also assumes that for this post only able and versatile men would be chosen.

Within the territories themselves the policy of limited responsibility was for long pushed to the point of scandal, and until the early 'thirties there can have been few colonies, at least in Africa, that were so neglected. But, as has already been said, this neglect is now being remedied, and Bechuanaland and Swaziland at least should in time become comparatively wealthy. It is only in Basutoland, overcrowded, fighting against soil erosion, and, as far as is known, with no mineral resources, that one has serious fears of the economic future. That all three Protectorates need more men and more money to carry out a full programme of social and economic development cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, progress in the last 20 years has been remarkable and provided there is no interruption and no relaxation of effort they should—always with reservations in the case of Basutoland—have a reasonably prosperous future.

Political progress has been slower. Popular representation is vested in councils, in Bechuanaland and Swaziland African and European, in Basutoland African only. Their rôle is only advisory and their advice is not binding on the Resident Commissioners, who are at liberty to accept or reject it as they please. The consequence is that their debates, though frank and very lengthy, have an air of unreality, and one sometimes senses in their members a certain frustration. Local government is carried on by means of Native Authorities in accordance with the principles of indirect rule. The manner in which this form of rule is exercised is open to some criticism, but, except for occasional scandals, and in Basutoland the horror of ritual murder, in which chiefs' families are implicated, the system works well enough and the people themselves seem quite satisfied.

The European administration was previously recruited directly in Southern Africa. In recent years recruits have begun to join the service from Great Britain in significant numbers. Suggestions have been made that because of their South African origin some of the officials are imbued with colour prejudice. This is quite untrue. The administration consists of able, fair-minded and loyal men, somewhat limited in outlook by reason of the isolation of the Protectorates from the main stream of colonial life, but on the whole

perfectly adequate for their duties. Efforts have been made comparatively lately to bring the Protectorate services into the colonial system of promotions, transfers and exchanges. This may be all to the good, but it may also have the effect of destroying the contentedness and local loyalty that enabled the old administration to work away happily in sometimes unattractive places, without very much hope of high promotion, but also without restlessness, just for love of the people and of the country. The principal fault of the administration is that far too few of its officers speak African languages at all fluently.

The conclusion is that materially the Protectorates are doing as well as can be expected and far better than might have been foreseen 20 years ago, but that the political organization gives less ground for satisfaction and might be changed. One can pass the C.R.O.; there are good reasons why the same office that handles relations with South Africa should also deal with Protectorate affairs, and one cannot any longer complain that the Protectorates themselves are neglected. But the time has come when we should seriously consider whether the High Commissioner should not be relieved of the government of these dependencies. In that case how would they be governed ? One suggestion has been made that alongside the High Commissioner there should also be a governor for the Protectorates, with his headquarters in one of them. There is little point in this multiplication of offices. The thing could be done quite simply by raising the status of the Resident Commissioners to that of governors and by giving them the right of direct access to the Secretary of State. There are several places administered by governors which are poorer and smaller than these. The High Commissioner would then only concern himself with the Protectorates as representative of the British Government when anything affecting South Africa needed to be discussed with the Union Government.

Within the Protectorates one reform is necessary beyond doubt. It is fully time that the outmoded advisory councils were abolished and replaced by legislative councils. If properly constituted these would give the people of the country a real outlet for their political talent and a genuine and creative interest in their affairs. There is plenty of material in the Protectorates from which councillors could be recruited and there is no reason why a legislature in each territory should not exercise its powers in a satisfactory way.

There are no very obvious changes to be made either to the system of local government or to the European administration. The Native Authorities have shown themselves, on the whole, to be a satisfactory instrument of government and generally acceptable to the people. It would in any case be difficult, if not impossible, to replace them with anything else and only changes in detail here and

there might be suggested. The European administration has stood up well to the increasing tempo of the times, and, in Bechuanaland, to an extremely difficult political situation created by the Seretse affair.

There is however one long overdue reform in administrative dispositions which concerns Bechuanaland alone. This territory must be the only one in the empire that has its capital outside its own borders. Mafeking, where headquarters are situated on a piece of land called the Imperial Reserve, is 16 miles south of the southern boundary of the Protectorate. A site in the Protectorate combining convenient position, good communications, plentiful water and other amenities is not easy to find and the move would certainly be expensive. Nevertheless it should be made. A capital in the Protectorate would not only have obvious economic and administrative advantages, but it should also, in time, become a focus of interest and loyalty to its people.

The Protectorates, especially Bechuanaland, have recently been very much in the news. Though the cause of this publicity may be regrettable, it has at least had the effect of focussing public and official interest on these countries and their worthy, loyal people in a way that sounder but less sensational arguments, based on their needs, did not. It is impossible that British public opinion would now countenance the transfer of the Protectorates to any other government, and it is unlikely that they will ever be allowed to fall back into the state of stagnation from which they have comparatively lately emerged. It is to be hoped that the question of political reform, which, as this article has tried to show, needs examination, will also not be forgotten.

(*Now Secretary of the Taylor Institution, Oxford University, Mr. Anthony Sillery, C.V.O., was formerly Resident Commissioner for the Protectorate of Bechuanaland.*)

GERMAN RESTITUTION AND REPARATION

By Norman Bentwich

THE declaration in September by the Chancellor of the Western Germany Federal Government about restitution to the victims of Nazi spoliation, and about reparation, in particular, o the Jewish people, who were the most helpless victims, is a welcome gn of grace. There have been personal declarations of regret and epentance by leaders of the German church and the laity for the rrible extermination by the Nazis of six million Jews. But this is ie first time that the head of a Government in Germany has con-ssed that " unspeakable crimes were perpetrated in the name of the erman people, which imposed upon them the obligation to make oral and material amends." And that confession was followed y the declaration that, " the Federal Government are prepared, intly with representatives of Jewry and of the State of Israel which as admitted so many homeless refugees, to bring about a solution the problem of material reparation, in order to facilitate a spiritual irging of unparalleled suffering."

During the summer the British and American High Commissioners Western Germany addressed letters to the premiers of the provinces the British and American zones to confirm the determination their Governments to complete the process of restoring their operty to the victims of Nazi persecution. The British High ommissioner added : " You should know that my Government tend to insure that provision is made in the contractual agreements tween the Federal Government and the Allied Governments for e preservation of the law now regulating restitution in the British ne and for continued execution of the programme thereunder."

* * * *

The Nazi spoliation of the Jews, not only in Germany but in every untry occupied by the Germans, was on an unparalleled scale. ie purpose, carried through with German thoroughness, was to prive the Jews of all their property, mobile and immobile. It was rsued under cover of legal enactments, partly by confiscation of nd, valuables and securities, partly by forced sale of businesses, uses and immovable property, and partly by special taxes levied on

all who left the country. The value of the property so taken ran into billions of marks. The Allied powers in 1943 solemnly declared their intention to right this wrong and secure the restitution of the property at the end of the war. And after the unconditional surrender of Germany, restitution and reparation were included among the reserved subjects in which the Allied Control Commission had full powers of legislation. The hope and intention in 1946 was to issue one uniform law of restitution for the four occupied zones. But before there was agreement between the Allies on the terms of the law, they had fallen out on other, and more vital, issues. The draft law was held in suspense, and the action for restitution was postponed except that in each zone the holders of property acquired during the Nazi régime were ordered to file a statement, and any disposition of the property was blocked.

The Americans were the first of the occupant powers to take action. In November 1947 they issued a military government law on restitution of identifiable property, of which the principles have been a model for legislation in the other zones. The French followed them in 1948, but it was not till May 1949 that the British issued their military government law for the British zone. Two months later an ordinance was enacted in Berlin by the City Council (*Magistrat*) for the British, American and French sectors. The four laws differ in detail but follow the same broad lines.

The express aim is to secure, to the largest extent possible, the speedy restitution of identifiable property to persons who were unjustly deprived of it between January 1933 and May 1945 for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political views or political opposition to National Socialism. Property is to be restored to its former owner or his successor in interest, even though the interest of other persons who had no knowledge of the wrongful taking must be subordinated. Provisions of the law for the protection of purchases in good faith, which would defeat restitution, are disregarded, except where the law provides otherwise. The examination and adjudication of the claims is entrusted not to Allied bodies but to German tribunals composed of judges specially selected with the approval of the Allied government. That system follows the trusting precedent of what were called the " Old Lace Trials ", in the British zone, of the less important Nazi leaders by German courts in 1947 and 1948. It was, however, hardly calculated to achieve the speedy restitution which was the aim. German judges have a habit of elaboration, and they were not likely to shed it in dealing with matters which were unpopular with their fellow citizens. Doubtless a knowledge of German law was essential for the fair trial of the claims ; but that might have been supplied by the appointment of German judges as assessors to an Allied authority resolved to carry

hrough restitution without delays. However, in all the three zones he Allied judicial control of the process has been exercised only in he highest of four instances.

It was another invitation to delay that claims for restitution normally assed through three German instances : (1) The restitution agency, omposed of a single judge who tried to bring the parties to an micable settlement ; (2) the restitution chamber, which, failing uch settlement, heard the case forensically and gave a legal judgment nd (3) the court of appeal of a region, which heard appeals both on he facts and on points of law. The final recourse was to an Allied ribunal which, in the British zone, was called the Board of Review, nd was composed of three British members. They could review he judgment when they found that the German tribunal had per-etrated some miscarriage of justice, or given a perverse interpretation f the law. They could, moreover, give an opinion on some con-oversial point of the law which had engaged two or more German ibunals. But if speed and justice are generally incompatible, the resent system makes a combination of speed and restitution almost npossible.

True, the military government law laid down rules of procedure hich were designed to circumvent legal obstruction. The restitu-on authorities are directed to take fully into account the circum-ances in which the claimant finds himself as a result of measures f persecution, and are to receive sworn declarations where the roduction of first-hand evidence is rendered difficult or impossible. n the other hand, the law provides for counter-claims, for the obliga-on of the claimant to repay the purchase price, if it was received by m, for taking accounts of profits and encumbrances, and so rth; abundant opportunities for a determined defendant to put off e day of reckoning.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and in fact the experience f the three zones has proved that, even with Allied supervision, the rocess of restitution is measured and long-drawn. In the American ne, where the law has been in operation four years, about half the 20,000 claims have been finally disposed, and the value of the roperty restored is some 700 million Deutsche Marks which, at the ficial rate of exchange, is equal to 60 million pounds. In the rench zone, where the number of cases is very much smaller, the roportion disposed of is about the same. In the British zone, here the law was enacted in 1949, the position is more unsatisfactory; r less than a quarter of the claims filed have been disposed of. In erlin, the outcome is still more meagre ; only a tiny fraction of the aims have been settled.

The prospects of settling the bulk of the claims remaining are not gloomy indeed as the mere figures would indicate. In both the

British and the American zones a large part, nearly half, are in respec of unclaimed, heirless, and communal property, and the claimant not an individual but a trust corporation which has not to prove title c succession. The Allied governments approved the establishment c these bodies, which claim, and take over, the properties and appl them, or the compensation therefor, to the benefit of the refuge victims of the Nazis. They are concerned with collective and no with individual rehabilitation. The effort has been made in th American zone to arrange an overall settlement of all the cases of th kind with the governments of the province or *land*. In this way th government pays a lump sum to the trust corporation, and takes ove the claims against the individual restitutors. The arrangement ha been made in two of the four provinces in the American zone and, it were adopted in the other two, the task would be mainly accon plished. In the British zone two trust corporations have bee approved, one for Jewish and the other for non-Jewish claims. Bu they have not yet been working a year. A commission appointe last summer by the Foreign Office to inquire into the delays c restitution recommended that in the British zone likewise attemp should be made to obtain a global settlement of the claims of the tw corporations. It made also detailed suggestions for simplificatio of the law and the procedure.

Inevitably, a resistance to the process of restitution has bee engineered by the " victims of restitution " and by the Neo-Nazi whose resurgence in Western Germany has recently given cause fo anxiety. A League of Loyal Restitutors has been formed, and carri on vigorous political activity for a revision of the law, which wou effectively emasculate it, and for stopping amicable settlements, whic are the only way of assuring a speedy solution. The Loyalists hop that Allied control will soon be reduced or abandoned ; and it wa probably to counter their agitation and manoeuvres that the Britis and American High Commissioners made their categorical declara tions.

The restitution of identifiable property is only a part of th remedial action for the wrongs done to individuals by the Nazi Larger numbers of persons and greater sums are involved in th claims for compensation for loss of liberty, loss of life and healt damage to property, business, or calling. The principle that th German authorities, federal or provincial, should pay indemniti to the mass of sufferers in the Nazi concentration camps or the di placed persons' camps has been recognized. And in several of th provinces the adjudication of claims has been proceeding for son time. Tens of thousands of the flotsam and jetsam population wh were displaced by the ruthless war machine of the Nazis have file their claims. The British zone is again relatively backward in dealin

ith these claims. One of the unsettled questions there is whether efugees from Germany, now living in the Allied countries or in srael, are entitled to compensation on the same terms as those who ave remained in Germany, and if so, how the transfer of such an ndemnity can be arranged. It is estimated that the total amount nvolved by the indemnification claims is 3 billion marks, or 250 illion pounds.

The third branch of restitution, in the broad sense of the term, is ne claim against the central German Government for compensation or movable property which was confiscated, either directly or in the orm of spoliatory taxation. The property has disappeared in most ases, and the claim is for money compensation. The total amount estimated at 2 billion German marks, or 170 million pounds, in the hree zones. Hitherto the Federal Government have not admitted ability for the obligations of the former Reich government ; and ne Allies have not made a categorical statement about federal esponsibility. But the declaration of Dr. Adenauer at least suggests dmission of moral responsibility and, in view of the remarkable ecovery of the German economy, it should be economically racticable for the Federal Government to pay these debts, possibly y the allocation of a share of the equalization of burdens tax, which being introduced in Western Germany, on the lines of our war amage tax.

So far we have been dealing with the various forms of restitution nd compensation for property and for injuries to individuals. A rger aspect of reparations for the Nazi crimes against humanity erpetrated upon all the Jews in Europe has been raised in recent onths by the Government of Israel, not directly with the German overnment but with the three occupant powers of Western Germany. rael claims a substantial contribution for the resettlement of the lf million displaced Jews from central Europe, who have migrated nce 1933 to the National Home or to the new State. They have me from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and they ntinue to come from Rumania and Hungary. Most have arrived estitute of material goods or capital, and the cost of settlement aches astronomical figures. All that has been done hitherto by ay of German contribution to the enormous bill for resettlement is e allocation, at a conference of the Allied powers in Paris in 1946, the non-monetary gold found in Germany by the Allies, and of a m of 25 million dollars from German assets in neutral countries. hose sums were placed at the disposal of the Inter-Governmental ommittee for Refugees, and by them applied for Jewish refugees rough two Jewish philanthropic bodies.

The recent declaration of Dr. Adenauer holds out the hand to the overnment of Israel and to the Jewish bodies for direct negotiation.

Hitherto, opinion in Israel has been divided on the point of holding any diplomatic relations with the German State. One of the motives of that refusal to talk was the absence of an admission of guilt and of any act of repentance by the Germans. The outspoken statement of the Chancellor goes some way to correct that omission. Material reparations are " to facilitate a spiritual purging " of unheard-of suffering.

The response of the Government of Israel has been cautious but not unpromising. They want to see acts of reparation before they can consider the profession of repentance as genuine. They have put a figure to their claims on account of the 400,000 immigrants from Germany and central Europe who have been absorbed into the State since the Hitler persecution. Israel has hitherto opposed at the United Nations the restoration of Germany to the comity of nations. And she opposed the ending of the state of war between the western nations and Germany. If a new spirit is shown in Germany and reparation is made, she may be willing to drop that hostility, and fulfil the vision of George Eliot, who, in the nineteenth century, was among the first to hail the return of the Jews to their historic home : " The new Judaea shall be a land set for a halting place of enmities."

(*Professor Bentwich was a member of the Foreign Office Committee which went to Germany last summer to report on the progress of restitution in the British Zone.*)

UNIVERSITY GRANTS

By Douglas Veale

TO most people it would seem to be a self-evident assumption that the University Grants Committee which is distributing more than £13,500,000 a year of public money to universities, ıust exercise some control over the purposes on which the money spent. To anyone familiar with universities the assumption is ot quite so self-evident as it appears. There are so many factors in niversities which limit the capacity for new expenditure that even if e universities were given a kind of Fortunatus's purse into which dip, their expenditure would not be likely to get out of hand. he most obvious of these limiting factors are staff and buildings. is never easy to create a new post in a university because there e so many conditions to be fulfilled. In the first place the need r the post must be felt by enough members of the faculty in which is to be established, to create a demand for it. Then there must e someone able and willing to fill it who is already something of a ecialist in his subject which will often be one not widely studied therto. And finally there must be some place in which he can work r which there is no stronger competitor. But shortage of buildings amps university development just as much as it does every other nd of institution. Even were there no building controls in operation e fact that buildings must be close to one another if they are to be any use, forces the universities to restrict their development to ose buildings which they themselves feel that they cannot do thout. Finally, universities are subject to one limiting factor nich is probably unique—the absence of motive. For instance, e compulsion to teach is a stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, t expand the number of pupils to the point at which teaching leaves time for study and research, and it becomes a burden. Or again, allow two men to occupy themselves on exactly the same investiga- n would to any head of a department seem an inconceivable aste of time, money and space, because, contrary to commercial perience, the multiplication of a successful academic process is t an additional source of profit but an outright loss. The claim at universities if given a free hand would not spend extravagantly is t disproved by their always under the present system asking for re State grants than they get. There is all the difference in the

world between bearing the final responsibility for your own expenditure both wise and unwise, from whatever source it is met, and being able to leave to some other authority the responsibility for settling what you shall spend.

In the report of the University Grants Committee on development published in 1948, an extract from a report submitted by one university was quoted with approval : it was that " a proved capacity for useful expenditure" was a factor which ought in some measure to govern the allocation of public funds. The committee's approval of this quotation indicates that it recognizes that there is some force in the view stated above. And that view is not without respectable precedent in the shape of the formula by which under the Local Government Act, 1929, grants to local authorities were intended to be fixed. The scheme of that Act was roughly that the existing Government grants were consolidated and increased : they were then to be reviewed periodically and were to increase automatically as the total expenditure of local authorities increased. As long as any local authority could satisfy the central authority that it was not below the average level of efficiency, it was not required to make a case for increased grants nor were the sum total of local authorities required to make out what would nowadays be called a global case. How lamentably we have fallen short of this ideal is well known. But the scheme broke down not because there was anything wrong with the principle, but because constant changes in the structure of local government since 1929 prevented it from ever having a fair trial.

Lest it should be objected that the local authorities were required to increase their expenditure out of the rates (their " own money ") in order to attract increased grants under the formula, while the universities have no resources corresponding to the rates which they can increase at will, it is only necessary to point out that even in 1949-1950 Government grants produced 63.9 per cent. of the total recurrent expenditure of all universities. Of the remaining 36.1 per cent. fees, which were 17.7 per cent. of the total expenditure, are one source of income which increases automatically as numbers grow. But even if it had to be admitted that an automatic formula could not be applied to Government grants to universities, there would be no need to rush into the opposite extreme. No-one would nowadays wish to revert to the discredited system under which grants from the central Government should be paid, only after every detail of the proposed expenditure has been scrutinized in Whitehall. There is no need to argue the case against that view, because there is no ground for believing that anybody holds or ever again will hold it.

The question, then, which is worrying all universities in the British Commonwealth and many of them in the U.S.A., is what amount of control by the authority which allocates grants of public money

ill be demanded by Governments ? What they are all wondering n Great Britain is whether the University Grants Committee will be llowed to become a body whose duty is to extract from the public urse all the money that the universities would like to be able to pend, or be forced, by pressure from without, to be one that imposes pon the universities the tasks which the public demands. The olicy ultimately prevailing will, of course, be a compromise, but wards which extreme will it have a bias ? The answer depends ainly upon whether the common sense of the universities themselves given time, and has the will, to operate.

A Warden of All Souls who visited France after the Treaty of miens and had the privilege of an interview with Napoleon uonaparte, was asked on his return what the great man was like. Well," he said, " it was easy to see that he was not a university an." And that was all he had to say. The intellectual arrogance hich prompted that remark has not even yet entirely disappeared om the universities, but there are hardly more than vestigial remains f it. In Oxford and Cambridge the stream of visitors eminent in all alks of life who, as honorary fellows of colleges or in other capacities, ass to and fro between the world of action outside and the world f thought within the universities, and in the other universities the ixed composition of the governing bodies, keep academic opinion close contact with well-informed lay opinion. Even, therefore, if holars were, as citizens, indifferent to social problems (which is far om being the fact), their minds could not fail to become infected by ese contacts with an interest in those problems.

Will Governments have the patience and restraint to allow these fluences to operate spontaneously ? The appeal to experience does t give a very encouraging answer. The recent history of local vernment is a warning against what may happen to the universities. has long been accepted doctrine in this country that the healthy orking of democracy demands the existence of strong organs of cal government. If this doctrine means anything it means that ere ought to be some machinery for adjusting central plans to cal conditions ; and that machinery can, of course, be used for struction as well as for adjustment of the central plan. Nevertheless, if the central plan is a good one, the obstructive local authority certain in time to learn its error. But the bureaucrat in his office nnot see the endless local difficulties out of which what seems to m to be a wanton obstruction arises, and the result has been the pid erosion of local government and the crushing out of individualism. The bureaucrat's excuse is that while the grass is growing, e horse starves.

What makes men and women take up academic careers is not the pe of becoming rich or powerful, but their liking of the conditions.

The most important of the conditions is that the universities give an environment in which extreme individualism can flourish. That, of course, is not claimed on their behalf as a merit but is stated as a fact. Interference with this individualism is a breach of an implied condition of the employment of every academic person. Somehow or other this individualism has got to be preserved, and the task of university administration is to stand between it and the harsh social forces which threaten it.

What are the particular matters in which initiative in a university ought to continue to be vested in small units ? Probably none of these would ask for more—except, of course, the elementary right to survive—than to settle and vary their own programmes of work, and for protection against any interference with their methods or any form of censorship of their results. From time to time, in all academic pursuits survival means expansion. A point comes at which data can no longer be usefully accumulated, but must be used. If expansion of a subject is arbitrarily halted at that point, the subject stagnates. Obviously such expansion is most likely to be halted at times like the present when retrenchment of public expenditure is a condition of national survival. And that condition prompts also prying into the details of how public money is spent. The change from an expanding to a contracting economy is anyhow a painful one. The universities cannot claim that they ought not to be asked to submit to this change. But each university can judge for itself better than anyone else can judge for it, how the change can best be made. Some immediate social need may suffer in the process, but no social loss could be greater than the loss of the universities' independence.

How simple, then, it all seems : the several parts of the university submit their claims for money to the central authority in the university ; that body presents them in the most persuasive form possible to the University Grants Committee, which in its turn presents them to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who foots the bill. At no stage dares anybody to criticize because that would be an infringement of academic independence. But of course in real life things do not work like that. The lawyer who dissuades his client from a particular plea, true though it be, because he " will never persuade the Court to believe it," or Sir Robert Peel when he told the Under Secretary for Ireland that it " was vain to say to the House of Commons : ' This is a delicate subject and does not bear discussion '—a loud laugh would be the answer to such an argument, are both asserting the right of the person who has to present a case to influence the selection of the facts presented. In the presentation of a claim for grants the selection at each stage is inevitably of claims to be dropped, not of claims to be added. And there can be no

scape from the risk that sometimes what looks well on paper may ust what is really more worth while. The risk is reduced but not emoved by the composition of the University Grants Committee tself, which is a body mainly of eminent scholars, themselves engaged n academic work and well qualified to distinguish what is meretricious rom what is sound.

The British universities have grown up in habits of thrift. They ave had so little to spend that they undertook no enterprise unless he prospect of valuable results was assured as fully as profound hought and careful preparation could make it. That is one way of etting results. Another is to dash into one investigation after another the money is available and perhaps get the same result in the same me but at much greater expense. (And of course there are stages etween these extremes.) Apart from the cost, the relative merits f the two methods depend in part upon temperament. One man is autious and reflective, another is bold and intuitive. But few cholars can be first the one and then the other. One danger of ependence on State grants is that periods of free and restricted xpenditure will alternate and that the universities will be unable to djust their programmes quickly enough. It may well be that the ost important task of university administrators, both in the uni- ersities and in Government, will be to avoid abrupt changes in the ate of expansion and development. In the Annual Report for 950-1951 Oxford calculated that only about 43 per cent. of its total xpenditure was controllable. The rest was spent on such purposes s the stipends of permanent academic staff and the essential upkeep f premises. The same report pointed out that when in 1930-1931 e Government attempted drastic economies with the determination achieve results, national expenditure, until the conversion of the ve per cent war loan was carried out, was reduced by no more than ree per cent. of the total. Even that result required special legisla- on enabling contracts to be broken without compensation. niversities could no more than the Government suddenly reduce eir existing activities except by wrecking important parts of them, ith unforeseeable consequences to the remainder. What they could o is to restrict developments.

All developments fall with more or less precision into two classes. ither they are a natural growth from an established stock, which it ould be as criminal to check as to check a child's growth with gin nd compression, or they are the planting of a new stock which is xpected in due course to flourish and yield fruit. When a develop- ent of the latter kind is not undertaken, the ultimate loss both to arning and to the public may be even greater than in the other ase, but nobody knows for certain and no established interest uffers. If then the universities knew in advance what increments

of grants they were going to get for a long time ahead and were assured of proper notice of any intention to reduce them, they could adjust their programmes accordingly, giving priority to the growth of established stocks.

If a scheme for automatic increments were introduced and the periodic revision of them given up, each university would be saved the labour now involved once in five years in arguing its case. This has been described as " time wasted which adds nothing to the sum of knowledge." The grants would be determined by the statistics of past expenditure and the Government would not be tempted to interfere in the details of academic business. There is nothing repugnant to commonsense in such an arrangement.

The form in which the University Grants Committee asked for information from the universities in the present quinquennial applications, indicates that the committee itself attaches much more importance to statistics than to picturesque presentation, and probably intends to work out some kind of standard figures of growth against which the claims of each university can be measured. In such a state of affairs what would be the functions of the University Grants Committee ? Probably much more important than was originally intended. When the automatic growth of State grants was introduced for local authorities, everybody recognized that the inefficient local authority must be penalized. The Minister of Health's function was to judge by all the information open to him whether any particular authority was inefficient within the meaning of the Act. That scheme was never given a fair trial and perhaps it would not have worked because of the political difficulties. Probably the difficulties might be less when dealing with universities ; men of learning quickly know when a department is losing its distinction. There will hardly ever be a university in which from time to time some department is not in that state, but if there were one in which several departments were simultaneously in it, the position would have been reached at which intervention would be justified and would present few difficulties.

(*Mr. Veale's article is a sequel to his " University Administration" published in the November* 1951 *issue of* THE FORTNIGHTLY. *Since* 1930 *he has been Registrar of Oxford University.*)

TRACKING SEA BIRDS BY RINGING

By Richard Perry

ONE of the most fascinating scientific experiments of this century has been the marking of individual birds by means of light metal rings on their legs. Each ring bears a serial number and ference. Thus birds ringed in Great Britain, under the auspices of he British Trust for Ornithology, bear the inscription *British Museum Nat. Hist. London.* But marking by this method has now reached nternational proportions. In North America some 400,000 birds re banded annually, and some 20,000 recovered of those banded in revious years. In Britain a record total of over 57,000 birds were nged in 1949 and some 3,000 recoveries were reported. Extensive nging is, or has been, undertaken in Norway, Sweden, Finland, the .S.S.R., Germany, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, zechoslovakia, Switzerland and Poland, with Greenland, Iceland nd the Faeroe Isles contributing their quota.

In Great Britain about half the annual total of ringed birds are estlings and the other half adults or juveniles trapped in various pes of cages, either during the nesting season, or in their winter uarters, or at such migratory stations around our coasts as the Fair le, midway between Shetland and Orkney, the Isle of May in the irth of Forth, Spurn Head, Cley on the north Norfolk coast, Lundy the Bristol Channel, or the island of Skokholm off the Pembroke- ire coast.

There are various advantages in marking individual birds with actically fool-proof numbered rings. Thus, where previously we uld only conjecture as to the place of origin of a bird shot or found ead, and could only ascertain its approximate age if it was in one of e immature plumages, we can now learn, by referring the ring mber to the appropriate authority, the exact locality in which any rd recovered was ringed and, in the case of a nestling, its precise ge—thus obtaining a mass of data on that intriguing problem, the otential life span of a wild bird. The recoveries of ringed birds so throw light on such problems as the daily mileage of a migrant, e route it follows, and its powers of 'homing'. Finally, we can arn not only the exact breeding localities and winter-quarters of the rious geographical races of one species, but also those favoured

by the various age groups and sexes.

In the British Isles we are especially fortunate in the numbers and variety of species of our nesting sea birds, and it was really a summer spent in Shetland studying the breeding history of skuas and gannets that inspired me with the ambition to undertake what looks like being a lifelong piece of research—namely the analysis of the recoveries of all British and European ringed birds. These of course increase annually at the rate of some five per cent. of the total ringed every year, though a proportion of this five per cent. is made up of dead nestlings or fledglings, which, while of interest to the statistician calculating mortality rates and average expectation of life, is of no interest to me.

It may be remembered that during the course of that summer in Shetland I was able to ring 112 nestlings of the great skua or Bonxie and 28 Arctic skuas. From this operation sprang my present interest in ringing, and it is on the results of ringing sea-birds that I wish to concentrate in this paper. As it happens 'Operation Skua' has so far proved singularly unfruitful, for in the four years that have passed since my expedition only one ringed skua has been reported—that of a seven-months-old Bonxie which alighted exhausted on board a French fishing-smack off West Flanders in January 1947, and died the next day—which perhaps was not surprising, inasmuch as the skipper took the bird home with him.

Though almost negative, thus far, the operation has, however, raised an interesting problem, in so far as no ringed skuas of any kind have been seen in Shetland during the nesting seasons that have elapsed, though a special lookout has been kept for ringed birds. This apparent failure to return to their Shetland birthplace can be accounted for by four possibilities. First, by assuming that all have died in the interim period. This is highly improbable, though in stormy years there may be a considerable mortality among the juveniles. In 1939, for example, no fewer than eleven ringed young bonxies from Shetland came to grief on the British and Channel coasts between September and November.

We may assume, in the second place, that the young skuas do not return to their breeding grounds until they are some years old. This is very probably the case, as it is a characteristic of other large seafowl such as gulls, which do not begin to breed until they are four or five years old, while no young gannet has been recovered at its breeding cliff until its third summer, though more than 12,000 have been ringed and some 450 recovered. There are, however, two records of bonxies ringed as nestlings in the south of Iceland, which were shot off the north of Iceland in their second and third summers respectively. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that either were breeding when shot. Almost certainly they were not. And there is a third

cord of an Icelandic bonxie which was shot in south-west Greenland the August of its second summer. An Icelandic Arctic skua has, owever, been shot near its birthplace in its fourth summer.

A third possibility is that the young bonxies do not necessarily turn to nest in their native colonies or countries of origin. Thus, ough over 800 British bonxies have now been ringed, and 25 recovered ot one has been reported from its place of ringing, though one of ose 1939 birds ringed as a nestling on Noss was recovered six mmers later on the opposite mainland of Shetland. The remainder owever, have all been recovered as juveniles in their first autumn or inter as far south as Portugal, except for one—a nestling from the rth of Shetland, also ringed in 1939—recovered in its winter-arters off Boston, U.S.A., some 3,000 miles distant, the following ebruary, and another recovered off the Gironde in its first summer.

Finally, we could assume that all those I marked have got rid of their ngs, the bonxie having a powerful beak, or that the rings have been orn away by salt water action. This, again, is improbable, for such rge marine birds as cormorants, herring-gulls and Sandwich terns ve all been recovered wearing rings more than 20 years old. Thus, is still possible that some of those skuas ringed in 1946 may be covered in Shetland. Skuas are long-lived fowl. There is a record a bonxie living to the age of 24 years in captivity, while two of the naller Arctic skuas are known to have returned to the same nesting rritories in Shetland for at least 31 consecutive years.

On the other hand it is possible that some, at any rate, of the Noss ungsters will not return to nest on that island at their appointed ne. Consider in this respect the puffin. This, again, is a species at may not breed for some years after fledging. The bird fowlers the Faeroe Isles, indeed, assert that the puffin does not begin to eed until it is at least four years old, and in fact no ringed nestlings ve been re-taken on those islands until their third summer. A ung puffin ringed on Skokholm, however, was recovered on that and the following July, though, again, this does not necessarily ply that it was breeding. (It is worth noting perhaps that there is a eroese record of an albino puffin which was to be seen at the same lony for 60 years, though it did not alight to breed during the last n years of its life.) Now, all these young Faeroese puffins returned entually to their native colonies, but this has not been the case with landic puffins. Thus, of 16 nestlings ringed in that country, every e was recovered two, or three, summers later at a different colony m that in which it had been ringed ; whereas, of 20 ringed as eeding adults, all but five were recovered, up to seven summers er, at the colonies in which they had been ringed. Similarly some res of puffins ringed as adults in Orkney have all been recovered

where ringed ; a French-ringed nestling was recovered two summers later in the Scilly Isles.

If then, the habits of puffins are to be thought typical of seafowl in general, there is a clear tendency for the adult sea bird to return to the same breeding colony year after year, but a likelihood that the young bird may eventually breed in a different locality from that in which it was born. Thus the Noss skuas may eventually turn up in some other parts of Shetland or Orkney, or even in Faeroe or Iceland, where of course the chances of seeing or recovering any ringed birds are very much less than in Shetland.

If, too, it is a fact that young sea birds, rather than returning to their birthplaces to breed, are as likely, or more likely, to accompany any adults they may contact at the winter fishing grounds to the breeding grounds of the latter, we can understand how these youngsters are able to achieve their remarkable migratory journey. Consider again, in this respect, the puffin. On December 20 and 21, 1939, by an extraordinary coincidence, two young puffins, which had been ringed within a week of each other on St. Kilda the previous August, were recovered on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland—those wonderful fishing grounds for sea birds from breeding stations on both sides of the Atlantic. Though the adult puffins may be seen at their nesting burrows on the night their young ones fledge, they do not apparently associate with them once they have got down to the sea, for juvenile puffins are always seen alone at sea. But obviously the latter cannot divine the whereabouts of the winter fishing grounds of whose very existence they are ignorant. We must assume, therefore, that eventually the youngsters contact adult birds from their own or other colonies and accompany them to the fishing grounds. It is not therefore surprising to find that one young puffin from St. Kilda was recovered off Orkney the following March, while others from Sutherland and the Farne Islands have been recovered the same autumn or winter off the south of Norway. Others no doubt will eventually be reported from the Atlantic coast of France, where an adult, ringed in Pembrokeshire, was recovered off the Gironde two winters subsequently.

The significance of the young gannet cannot be overlooked. Here is a clear-cut instance of the young bird and the adult migrating separately, for while the earliest young gannets are fledging in August all, or the vast bulk, of their parents are still on the nesting cliffs in October, by which date the recoveries of ringed birds show that the advance guard of the fledgling gannets have reached western Morocco. True, young gannets are more often seen at sea in the company of older non-breeding birds than alone, and it is very possible that the latter lead the way to the southern limit of their winter range off Mauretania, 1,200 miles north of the equator. Even so, the number

f these older birds must be strictly limited, for 90 per cent. of those covered in North African seas have been juveniles in their first winter, and none has been older than in its fourth winter, while only ree gannets ringed as adults have been recovered as far south as pain, 90 per cent. of all adults ringed having been recovered in ritish waters.

These percentages illustrate the well known fact that the urge migrate is stronger in the young bird than in the adult, and decreases ith age, so that in the main we shall expect to find that those sea birds ndertaking the longest migrations are young. In no case has this ct been more beautifully demonstrated by ringing than in that of at charming little gull, the kittiwake, which nests in colonies of ousands on the cliffs around our coasts. While no fewer than 11 ung kittiwakes from British colonies, mainly the Farne Islands off orthumberland, have been recovered on the other side of the Atlantic pecially on the Grand Banks, no adult kittiwake has ever been covered outside British waters. Two of these youngsters were covered off south-west Greenland and Newfoundland respectively early as October 1 and November 14 their first autumn—that is to y not more than two or three months after they had fledged. No nged nestlings have been recovered at their birthplace before their cond summer, and some were still in the western Atlantic one or o summers after being ringed. Of these, one second summer bird s recovered far up the Davis Straight : while other nestlings from e Farne Islands and the Isle of May have been reported from such rying localities as Iceland, Faeroe, Denmark, Holland and the Bay Biscay. Those kittiwakes at the Grand Banks are joined by others m Denmark and Iceland, the latter being of special interest, cause the two Icelandic recoveries were both adults.

As our young kittiwakes move out of British waters in the autumn, their place is taken by others from colonies in the far north ; have the records of three nestlings from Murmansk in Arctic ssia, which were recovered on the east coast of Scotland in their st or second winters. These transatlantic voyages are not made ely, of course, in a west to east direction. Two Arctic tern stlings from west Greenland and New Brunswick respectively have en recovered in Britain as early as September and October their st autumn. Two others from Labrador were subsequently covered, one in the Bay of Biscay in October the same autumn, the ner on the coast of Natal (8,000 miles or more distant) in November, d a third from Maine was recovered in August in southern Nigeria ur years after ringing.

But the Arctic tern is a regular oceanic traveller, whose astounding grations span the seas from Arctic to Antarctic. Much more narkable are the vagrancies of individual coastal species brought

to light by ringing. Perhaps the most remarkable of these is th record of a Caspian tern which was ringed as a nestling on Lak Michigan and recovered 12 years later on the Yorkshire coast. Ha this bird not been ringed it would have been recorded as a vagran from a colony in western Europe or North Africa, where it also breeds as Caspian terns have been observed in the British Isles on some 3 previous occasions. Then there is the reverse case of another coasta and inland species, the gull-billed tern, of which a Danish nestlin was recovered in September the same year in Barbados. It is interes ing to note that this gull is also a native of the eastern Americas.

Everyone knows the black-headed gull, as common inland as on th coast, and a gull that one does not normally observe more than a mil or two offshore. Yet three black-headed gulls, ringed at Rossitte in the south-east corner of the Baltic, have crossed the Atlantic, tw of them as juveniles, to be recovered in Labrador, the Gulf of Mexic and Barbados ; the last was the unexpected destination, reached i November, after a flight of well over 4,000 miles. A fourth nestlin ringed in Belgium in 1932 was recovered in Labrador in its secon autumn.

Finally, there is the extraordinary record of a cormorant ringed i Holland and recovered two years later at a point west of the Grea Lakes, nearly 5,000 miles distant, though no other Dutch cormoran is known to have migrated further than North Africa. No doubt th remarkable bird was lost, though it was not in its first year. But the recoveries of ringed birds have demonstrated two facts above a others, they are that (*a*) if a bird has the power of flight there is virtuall no limit to the distance it can fly, and (*b*) wherever it may be on th earth's surface that point is always at one end of an imaginary lin prolonged from its breeding station, though, as we have seen, th latter is not necessarily the same as its birthplace. Of this, strikin evidence is afforded by a series of experiments performed with the ai of Manx shearwaters breeding on Skokholm. This shearwat nests underground in colonies on several islands off our west an north coasts, at which it is nocturnal, though fishing by day at se of course, up to 600 miles from its breeding station, each sex incubatin in turn for spells of up to six days. Though a bird of powerfu flight, it is seldom seen more than 200 miles out in the Atlantic an does not appear to winter further south than the Bay of Bisca More than 37,000 Manx shearwaters have now been ringed, of whic some 1,600 have been subsequently recovered. Among these are number of nesting adults which have been transported to a distan from Skokholm and then released. Their ability to ' home ' direct has been strikingly demonstrated. Thus one released at Start Poi in south Devon, 220 miles distant as the crow flies, was back in i nesting burrow on Skokholm within ten hours—two puffins release

rom the same place took five days to return to their burrows—while vo others released in Surrey were back the next day, and a non-reeding bird released in Worcestershire returned within five days, in ontrast to the record of another non-breeding bird which did not eturn until the following May. From further afield two released in ie Faeroe Isles covered the 700 miles back to Skokholm in 11 and 2 days respectively, while a Faeroese bird with a nestling took 32 ays to return to Faeroe from the Firth of Forth. An interesting ontrast is afforded by two Skokholm birds, one with a nestling and the ther with an egg, released on the Isle of May, the former ' homing ' 1 11 days, the latter in 27 days. From the French coast we have one eleased at Le Havre in April taking 29 days to return, and another eleased from Cape Finisterre in July not returning until the following Iay.

Thus far we have been dealing with ' homing ' records from within ie Manx shearwaters' specific, if not individual, breeding range, iough they do not of course normally fly over inland counties. But ow we have to consider four remarkable records of ' homing ' from ocalities where no Manx shearwater has ever been known to occur. irst two records of birds released at Venice, 930 miles as the crow ies, or 3,700 miles by sea, from Stokholm. In one instance the bird as back at its burrow within 14 days, in the other it did not return ntil the following March. And finally three records of shearwaters eleased in Switzerland, one returning from Berne in 13 days, and two om Lugano in 15 and 18 days respectively. The instances I have uoted are, of course, of successful ' homers ' (others never returned), ut they demonstrate conclusively that the migrant bird is as fixed in s relationship to its breeding station as the moon is to the earth. In ie present state of our knowledge each man may put forward his wn theory to account for this relationship, but I would suggest that ie ultimate solution to the problem will be expressed in terms of iagnetic attraction.

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KING DAVID
(An extract)

By Joseph Braddock

Sleep I could not for a black coil of trouble :
Tumultuous thoughts like burning tongues
Seared me, hissing malicious adders.
The cure I tried to find assailed me more.
Sleep. No sleep would come to me—sour thoughts
Like oxen yoked stumped heavily round and round,
With foreboding, corroding fears :
My sons were not my former joy ;
The stratagems of old Achitophel
Cold as a basilisk ; Abiathar stale too,
Remembering how, till lately, I would bend
To pore with him above new lettering,
His fine, historical accounts of battles ;
All savour gone, my age but vanity.
I sought the solace of my golden poetry,
To ease my pain with music of my harp.
Beauty would not dissolve in words—
I could not rest that night by any means.
The bars of moonlight, splintered by the lattice,
From wall and ceiling peered like amber eyes,
Pale as girls' whey cheeks on my cedar couch.
So in that heat I found the palace roof,
Thinking to wash me in the moon's clear fire ;
Take beauty's healing from a sleeping city,
A city signed in glory with my name.

The earth lay blanched in moonlight and in peace.
As I stood idle on the terrace, suddenly
My eyes with eagle speed embraced a sight
Making me young again, filling each vein
With tumult, with wild thunder of the spring.

For—God be raised !—a woman slim like fountain water
Moved on the roof-top below mine
Adjacent to the court : her body's wonder

Gleamed through a shift diaphanous, as delicate as morning gossamer.
Her beauty caught my breath, rousing my heart
To knocking, for that lucky raiment
Like a soft cloud passed from her well-fleshed shoulders,
Her polished flanks, dropped sighing round her feet.
She fell to rinsing from a silver basin
Certain she was unseen ; inclined her head
Shaking a glossy blue-black wing of hair,
Smiling in ecstasy of perfect youth.
Then, as she turned upon her heel
With lightly undulating, heavy hips,
White water-pearls adorned her sinuous back.

I asked Benaiah who she was.
Did deep blue eyes slant upwards towards temples
Of whitest elegance, made whiter far
By contrast with those loosened locks of jet ?
Was her nose slender ? Did her nostrils flare ?
If so, I know her."
Who is she ?
"I heard speech of her from your nephew, Jonadab,
Who shared the guard with me to-night."
Who is she ?
"Nothing escapes your nephew's wicked eye,
A know-all gossip ! "
Come !—her name ?
"Her name is Bathsheba."
Her lids hide treasures. Is she a virgin ?
"That flask is broken, will not seal again."
Ah, she is married. Her husband's name ?
" It is Uriah,
A Hittite in your bodyguard, now serving
In Rabbah."
Benaiah, my will is prisoner,
Held captive by the blue swords of her eyes.
Do not withhold your knowledge. Tell me all.
Only to dream such beauty can rekindle
Passion's beacon, heal hurt, banish darkness . . .
What of Uriah ? Speak of his character.
" He loves unbearded boys to train for war.
Women he treats as toys."
What age is he ?
" Around dull, callow twenty I should guess."
Ah wins that throw by twenty years ; but woman
Is nice of sense, and I am David—

U OF I

I am resolved to touch her living features,
Golden of body, golden of spirit.
Go, find my nephew Jonadab,
Command him to the house of Bathsheba. . .
As she is rosy, comely,
I'll woo her humbly ;
Nor dumbly with my poet's mouth.

Can I govern my heart, who rule a nation ?
I should commune much with my inner spirit ;
For love, that dizzy leaping flame enfolds me
To my soul's danger. What are passion, love, desire ?
More than alluring toils compelling Samson
To pull down pillars on the Philistines ;
More than prolific rut, a frolic lacing of lithe limbs ;
More than aspiring search, the wrestling with an angel.
For this love, as I know it, is divine ;
Her body is a glass where shines reflected
Cloud-hidden God, a holy writ of living beauty.

(*Sings to the accompaniment of his harp*)

How coldly curves the moon's scimitar !
Her whitest gleam
Is grey beside your curving breast.
The lion-visaged sun
Goes smoking home to rest,
Shows never a burning beam
More ruby-deep
Than your lips' proffered wine.
Look at the dazzling host of stars—
O little hands, O sultry hair,
Heart's blood of mine !—
Wheeling incandescent there :
None blaze so fiercely bright
As blue marauding eyes.
Fruit of my soul ! your eyes
Have started fires within my brain
No later weeping thunder skies
Shall ever quench again.

A LAMPLIGHTER IN VICTORIA STREET—III

By S. L. Bensusan

SITTING at his desk, scenes recalled by the lamplighter hold for him a quality of light and clarity of definition that rival any screen. He read a brief paragraph in *The Times*, stating that in Madrid the Home Minister had forbidden the use of the *banderillas de fuego* in the bull rings of Spain. In Victoria Street days they were in common use. From the Plaza de Toros of Seville and Cadiz and the Plaza del Triunfo in Madrid the lamplighter has watched mobs of savages, excited and clamorous, howling, "*Fuego! Fuego!*" to the president, whose fiat was needed to add crowning horror to a bloody scene, and if he has refused assent, further cries of *Verguenza! Verguenza!* (Shame)", have filled the air. Fire banderils placed with so much skill and daring on the shoulders of a bull that was not showing fight, exploded and scorched the skin. Seeing them in use made it impossible to go again to the bull ring. Then the lamplighter turns back for a moment to Seville to recall two strange sights. The first is the mourning procession for Espartero, ace of matadors, killed in the arena of Madrid by one of the famous Miura bulls, the "Herd of Death", to the almost hysterical grief of all Spain, a country which, even when very poor, would pay its most popular *Diestros* as much as £20,000 a year. The other picture is of the Plaza of San Fernando during one of the early morning walks, taken to avoid exercise in the "Hours of Fire". "Dawn's left hand was in the sky" but the plaza was filling up with women and children, many of the women in tears. Then the strains of a military band were heard, and as the bandsmen came leading a company of lads (they were little more), he asked one of the weeping women by his side where the recruits were going. "They are going to God, Señor, but their road is by the swamps of Cuba." This was for thousands of cases literally true. In the distance, but coming nearer week by week, was the Spanish-American war. Perhaps the sense of tragedy in town and country was heightened by the beauty of southern Spain at that season, its rich gift of sunshine, olive and vine, fruit and flowers, clear explanation why poverty and content could travel hand in hand.

The lamplighter can never forget the beggar he met on the river bank outside Cordova, a thing of rags and tatters, middle-aged, unwashed and singing. "You are happy," he said, offering him a

cigarette. "Why?" "It is a fine day, *Señor*," the beggar replied, "the sun warms me; I have two oranges in my pocket and no cares. Why should I not sing?" He rose to his feet to receive the peseta that rewarded happiness and raised what in far off times had been recognizably a hat. "*Vaya con Dios, Señor*," he said. He would have forgotten me by the time the peseta was spent in some *ventorillo*, but none the less nearly sixty years later my lamp reveals him still smiling, still full of the joy of life that must linger for all time in Andalusia among those who leave politics alone.

It is no far cry from the banks of the Guadalquivir to Madrid; it is a farther one from the beggar by his roadside to the sanctum of His Excellency the Duke of Almodovar in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the lamp lights his desk as he talks about Spanish interests in Morocco, and how in old times Spain sacrificed her wealth to extend the colonial empire that had gone. The Duke's secretary, Don Alfonso Merry del Val, was destined to become marquis and doyen of ambassadors in London, a grave, far-sighted man, intensely faithful to his convictions and his country. His brother became Papal Secretary of State. A newspaper indiscretion broke association with Madrid, but "Don Roberto", who was a friend of the Duke, promised to explain the position when they met at the Algeciras Conference, and wrote that all was well and the Duke would restore communication when he returned to Madrid. But he was not fated to return; unending work killed yet another man whose patriotism led him to overtax his strength. My lamp has not shone on two more serious patriots, who, though they marched so indefatigably behind the times, were capable of supreme loyalty; it shines at the same time on an old friend, well beloved and greatly admired, Don Roberto to his intimates, R.B. Cunninghame Graham to the rest. The lamp lights him upon three special occasions, our first and last meeting and one taken half way along the road of life. Only the first belongs to Victoria Street, for it was in the late nineties in the house—or should one say palace?—of Walter Harris, traveller and *Times* correspondent in Morocco. I had just arrived to lunch. "You have not met Cunninghame Graham," he says, as the tall elegant man sitting in a corner of the study rose to his feet. "I know him intimately," I say, as we shake hands, and he looks puzzled. "I have read and re-read *Al Moghreb el Acksa*", I explained, and his quick response marked the beginning of a friendship that lasted until the Destroyer of Delights intervened, more than forty years later.

The middle distance memory belongs to the time when the lamplighter was Don Roberto's guest at Ardoch in Dumbartonshire. We were walking along a country road and he pointed to a ruin on a hilltop. "That belonged to Robert the Bruce," he remarked. "I am rather proud to have it on my land." "It ought to be a nationa

onument instead of a mere ruin," I suggest. "Impossible," he plies. "If I gave it to the nation my countrymen would at once rn it into a public house and call it "The Original Bruce Arms."

The third and last memory is not far away and lies beyond Victoria treet. We are lunching together at the Spanish Restaurant, and he telling me that only a few days stand between him and his journey South America. "Don Roberto," I plead, "don't go. You e over eighty ; such journeys are for younger men. I have a horrid resentiment ; you are one of my oldest friends and I hate the ought of you travelling so far." "Cheer up, *Amigo*," he says, I shall be back before the season is over ; we will dine together nd I will tell you all about it. What a pity there is no longer an mpire Theatre complete with Adeline Genée ; what pleasant hours e gave us both!" Now my lamp shines back on a little company in a box the Empire. It holds Don Roberto's brother Charles (a ommander in the R.N. and Equerry to King Edward VII), his ster-in-law and nephew. The last named, little more than a school-y, is so enthusiastic about Adeline Genée, that I offer to take him und to the stage and present him, but Mrs. Charles forbids. "He too young to go behind the scenes," she says, with a fine sense of e proprieties of Victoria Street. To-day that boy is an admiral, lding a very important position, and owner of Ardoch where I was s uncle's guest.

The lamp shines on the Earl's Court exhibitions. There were many them, starting, if memory serves me truly, with the 'Healtheries' d 'Fisheries', and continuing for several years with a measure of ccess. Imre Kiralfy was the nominal head of the company that n the exhibitions, but he was not actively concerned. The real work as done by two men I knew and respected, Hermann Hart and Mr. rtley. They were pleasant, kindly men, concerned for the welfare those who worked with them, and one evening I met Mr. Hartley's y, an extremely intelligent looking youngster, frank, smiling and ractive. Hermann Hart remarked, as father and son strolled into e grounds : "You see that youngster there. I tell you he is stined to do great things. I have never met anyone of his years ite so gifted. Look out for him." Both my old friends have long ne to their rest, but there is no occasion to look far to discover the n, because he is General Sir Harold Hartley, K.C.M.G., F.R.S., who s distinguished himself in every field of activity that has attracted n, and in addition to his military and scientific achievements, is a ector of *The Times*.

At the music halls Harry Lauder, contrived to be amusing while mbining humour with decency, a task that proved too much for so ny of his contemporaries. I recall the Sunday evening when I met n at dinner in a friend's house. It was something of an occasion,

there must have been nearly a score of guests, and when our host said " I have persuaded my old friend, Mr. Lauder, to go to the piano," there was great applause. The comedian left the dinner table, went to the piano, paused for a moment to look at the guests and struck up the opening bars of a hymn, which he proceeded to sing as though he liked it. " Ye'll no' ha' forgotten, it's the braw Sawbath," he remarked quietly when the last chord sounded.

Writing of hymns recalls another incident that led to my giving offence quite unpremeditated to that eminent romantic actor, Mr Wilson Barrett. *The Sign of the Cross* was being presented at the Lyric Theatre ; I was standing in the wings watching the play from that coign of vantage. Miss Maud Jefferies was heroine, and a very beautiful one. The time came when all the people on the stage who were to be martyred sang a hymn to prove how little the prospect worried them. They had scarcely finished when Wilson Barrett came down to where I was standing. " Well, Mr. Bensusan," he said " what did you think of the hymn ? " " To tell you the truth, Sir," I said, pointing to Miss Jefferies, " I was too busy admiring her, to give a thought to any hymn." " You are very flippant this evening," he rebuked, and went off, to live up to the virtues inherent in the play.

The lamplighter had a great admiration for Beerbohm Tree, and visited him at His Majesty's Theatre, Haymarket, from time to time. It chanced that, following a long journey on the Continent, I received a letter from a newspaper, asking me to see Mr. Tree about a forthcoming production. I went down the corridor, knocked at the door and opened it. Sitting by the table was a huge fat man to whom I bowed and said : " I am waiting to see Mr. Tree." He waved me to a chair ; several minutes passed ; then a quite familiar voice said " You have forgotten me apparently." There was some excuse, for Beerbohm Tree was made up as Falstaff. They were playing *The Merry Wives of Windsor* but, having been out of England for so long I knew nothing of this.

Tree was at his best on the stage when the performance was on, but at his worst on the stage during a rehearsal, when his tongue was unrestrained. He would scold everybody, even his wife, and I can recall incidents that were embarrassing to the onlooker ; but he was very highly strung and gave everything that was in him to the part he was playing. One night I met him as he was coming off and he said to me : " How did it go ? " I forget the play, but it was a highly emotional one and he had excelled. " In the last act," I told him " I shivered ; my spine seemed reacted to your voice." " You could not have paid me a greater compliment," he said ; it had the merit of being true.

The lamp shines for a moment on a quiet, modest man, working in the outer office of my agents, Perris & Cazenove, as honest and

ompetent a firm as any writer could wish to deal with. It was a reat loss to me and I imagine to all their clients when they gave up usiness. The man, whose name I did not know, used to chat with ie. He looked simple but clever, I felt that he had some reserves of apacity that the office could never call for. Long years afterwards, hen I had reviewed *Limehouse Nights*, I had a letter from Thomas urke, thanking me. He wrote : " You won't have forgotten that e often used to meet in Henrietta Street when you were waiting to e Perris or Cazenove." Here was a writer of extraordinary power nd deepest sympathies, who died all too soon.

The lamplighter contributed by request to the first number of the *Daily Express*, but his notes were crowded out. This was no unusual ccurrence. One night Sir Arthur Pearson, pointing to a pile of apers, told a colleague : " More than two hundred pounds worth of legrams wasted for lack of space." There was a hint here of the xpenses that a daily paper must meet. David Anderson who ran ie London School of Journalism of which I am perhaps the sole urvivor, would tell the story of a man who sold his soul to the devil in eturn for three years of unlimited extravagance. A contract was rawn up and signed. The man ran a town house, a country house, a lediterranean villa and a yacht and the devil met all bills without inching. Then with only six months of the term to run, the man aid that, for a final experience, he would start a daily paper. The evil argued, cajoled, offered many other sources of excitement, but l in vain. " I will have a daily paper here and now," said the man. " I'll be back in half an hour," said the devil angrily. " Well," said ie man, when Satan returned, holding an envelope, " have you rought the money with you ? " " No," said the devil, " I have rought back your contract. There are limits to expenditure, even here I come from."

Before R.D.B., the well beloved, took charge at the *Express*, he was n the *Mail*. " You are going to bury yourself in Shoe Lane," Mr. Alfred ' told him, " the *Express* is doing 80,000 a day at the ost." To-day the paper has the highest circulation among our ailies. The lamplighter recalls the earlier editor, B. Fletcher obinson, who brought a great reputation from Oxford and was lled by oysters. He told me a strange story of how he went to evon for a holiday and, on Dartmoor, thought out the plot of *he Hound of the Baskervilles*, which he offered to the one man who ould do justice to it. "Two hours work," he remarked, " a thousand ounds an hour. Could that be beaten ?" " ' *Credo quia incredibile* ' ," told him.

Mr. Bensusan's other ' Lamplighter ' articles were published in the January 1950 *and January* 1951 *issues of* THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

THE POUND, THE DOLLAR AND INFLATION

May I offer some comments on the letter in the December 1951 issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY in which Mr. R. P. Schwarz refers to the article which I contributed last October ?

Mr. Schwarz contends that " the low level of British export prices should be corrected by an appropriate adjustment of selling prices, best effected by the exporters themselves." Any such adjustment would mean concerted action, directed to maintaining the extravagant profit margin which devaluation has made possible. How is concerted action to be brought about ? Who is to take the initiative ? Are the prices of exportable goods sold at home to be similarly adjusted, or is there to be a system of dual pricing ?

Mr. Schwarz suggests that " the expansion of incomes ought to be taken care of by our steeply progressive tax system." Taxation of excessive profits may be an effective method of restraining demand, but it leaves open the inducements to claim increases of wages, and diminishes the inducements to resist them.

Even as things are, the adjustment of export prices is being brought about by the rise of wages, which *pro tanto* nullifies the competitive advantage which devaluation was intended to confer.

He may be right when he says that the International Monetary Fund would not accept the view that fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold, linked to an unstable dollar, would constitute a " fundamental disequilibrium ' for other money units. But the idea that " the promotion of exchange stability " is to be attained by linking money units to an unstable standard is not very plausible.

Mr. Schwarz holds that " so long as rearmament continues on its present scale inflation can at best be slowed down. Even that requires international action." And he refers to American prices : " their rise cannot be halted, much less can they be reduced, without severe measures of control in the United States." But suppose the measures of control are not forthcoming ; does he imagine that the rise of prices must be communicated to Great Britain *regardless of the rate of exchange* ? Any comparison of British and American wages, prices and costs must be based on the rate of exchange. High American prices need not mean high British prices if the dollar value of the pound is raised.

Of the use of bank rate Mr. Schwarz says " it might well produce considerable unemployment." Like so many critics of bank rate policy, he seems to imagine that there is no intermediate stage between an over-employment which has brought our economic system to a state of breakdown and a state of deflation in which the number of unemployed will be reckoned by the million.

Yours faithfully,

R. G. HAWTREY.

London, W.8.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

PALMERSTON'S NICHE

By Asa Briggs

It has become part of the current rgon of politics to say that we are no nger living in the Age of Palmerston. n his painstaking study,* based on early twenty years' research, Professor Vebster shows that at any rate from 830 to 1841, Palmerston's policy was r from being a policy of glory and npowder. Expressions of national gotism were preceded by a recognition ethical values which Gladstone mself could not have bettered.

In this detailed and carefully docuented account, no new or startling nclusions emerge either about lmerston's character or his approach particular countries or to particular oblems. Indeed what Professor Vebster does, drawing upon his personal perience as well as his research in the udy, is to smash simplified explanaons of British motives and policy ring these years. He never rests ntent with a clever generalization, d although he usually proceeds with iet restraint, he sometimes indulges bouts of his accustomed vigour. In ace of bright witticisms gleaned from inted sources like Talleyrand, Greville Princess Lieven and sweeping conusions drawn from secondary thorities, he offers the reader a sober alysis based on years of primary search. In particular he has made tensive use of the private papers of lmerston at Broadlands, which have ver been used systematically before illuminate the dark corners of a fficult period of nineteenth-century plomatic history.

The book is introduced by 82 pages of neral discussion, which attempt to ace Palmerston in his niche. They nge widely over constitutional and onomic as well as diplomatic problems. There is only one point of importance which appears to be left out—the rôle of the British fleet which, as we are told later, although never very firmly, was an essential agent in the effective working out and execution of policy. Perhaps indeed throughout the whole of the two volumes too little is said about power as compared with what is said about the liberal movement or the social order which liberalism and nationalism disturbed. Professor Webster's emphasis is in line with his previous studies and is in some ways a pleasant change after much recent writing, but it contrasts forcibly with tabloid pictures of Palmerston's purposes and achievement.

As Professor Webster says in his conclusion, all estimates of these 11 years must necessarily be influenced by Palmerston's later career. The years 1830-1841 were years when many important decisions were taken concerning Belgium, the Near East, Spain and Portugal, but the years between the fall of Peel and the European Revolutions on the one side and the death of Palmerston and the rise of Bismarck on the other side were full of more momentous changes in international relations. Between 1830 and 1841 Palmerston undoubtedly stands out as one of the best of British foreign ministers, but will he stand out so well when the whole of his long career is uncovered with the same care as has been devoted to his first 11 years at the Foreign Office? Surely after 1848 it was not merely a question of Palmerston's foreign policy seeming "inconsistent" with that of his previous period of office; it was a question of British interests themselves shifting and changing in a new world, which Palmerston did not always

The Foreign Policy of Lord Palmerston, by Sir Charles Webster. Bell. 2 vols 63s.

understand. In such a setting the complications of Palmerston's character and outlook—impetuosity and patience, bluntness of speech and social charm, sympathy with continental liberalism and opposition to domestic reform, technical expertise and verbal extravagance—really began to be complicating.

For those who like history to be written in slogans and characters to be stereotyped, this book is full of salutary admonitions. During these years Palmerston was on good terms with the Court, and no-one hailed Victoria's reign with more enthusiasm or gave the Queen more praise than he. Inside the Cabinet Palmerston could be described as "the most amiable of colleagues on account of the good humour with which you tolerate the utmost freedom of discussion on every plan and every paper which you propose." He had not yet become, in Herzen's words, "the finest meteorological instrument in England, who indicated with the greatest fidelity the temperature of the middle classes." It was Peel and not Palmerston who was coming to represent "the idea of the age." Palmerston only became the Palmerston of legend after the period described in this book.

It is unfortunate for the conscientious historian, as well as it was for the radical reformer, that Palmerston lived for so long. If it has taken Professor Webster 20 years to deal with 11 years, it will certainly take at least another 20 to deal in equal detail with the rest. In the meantime, although Professor Webster has written a definitive account of the years 1830-1841, which may be supplemented but can never be supplanted, we must continue to make our own assessments of Palmerston's achievement as a whole. If we are not as tentative as we ought to be in our conclusions and seek for colour and excitement on the basis of imperfect evidence, we can claim in part extenuation that the age of Palmerston is continually becoming more exciting the further it slips away.

HUSKISSON AND HIS AGE, by C. R. Fay. *Longmans.* 30*s.*

It is not every biography that begins with the death of the hero. Mr. Fay has elected this approach—and not solely in order to remind his readers that Huskisson was that man who was killed in that railway accident in 1830. His method deliberately neglects the framework of time. Surveying with a delighted eye the period which he has thoroughly studied, Mr. Fay presents us rather with a series of chapters on different subjects connected with the life or at any rate the times of Huskisson—on Peel, on the art of letter writing, on the Sussex of Huskisson and Hayley, on the Liverpool of Huskisson and John Gladstone. The resultant work has a Proustian effect. It is discursive, it has a strongly essayist flavour, but at the end a full and interesting picture—a picture of the politico-economic England during the first half of last century—does emerge. It is fair to add that we are promised an exposition of Huskisson's policy in a later volume.

Obviously in a book like this each man will pick what is most to his taste. The chapter on the Staffordshire of Huskisson and Littleton, for instance, has matter on the truck system which could have added fire to Marx's indictment. Others will prefer an aspect of an age which embraced the rule of the old oligarchy as well as that of the new industrialism. A letter from Huskisson to Littleton has this charming postscript: "There is an old story of Dudley muttering 'how do you do' to the Duchess of Beaufort and then before he withdrew saying aloud to himself 'I think I have said enough.' I am just saying 'I owe Littleton a letter, I have written too much—but he need not read it.'" But much of the most graceful stuff was from other pens.

For the truth is that Huskisson, the "Liberal-Tory", tended a trifle to dryness. He had something of the Civil Service touch; not a great party man, but certainly a most capable administrator. Like every able man who has held power he grasped the fact

hat a Government can improve on the peration of *laissez faire*. In an stonishingly modern paper to iverpool, written a year or two after Waterloo, he shows how public work ndertaken by the Government acts as " multiplier " and spreads employ- nent among a much greater number of eople than those engaged directly by he authorities. Yet he was of course minently a sound currency man. Why was money invented at all " he rote a few weeks before his death "but hat it should serve as an invariable tandard, and a measure of value in ontracts between man and man ? " he close inter-relation between the urrency and the economic state of the ountry was axiomatic to him. " You ight as well make a Peer Chancellor f the Exchequer as pretend to make him he parliamentary and responsible epresentative of the Board of Trade " e wrote. And the assimilation of the oard to the Treasury, so far as it goes, hows foresight as well as insight. Vhen Huskisson became President of he Board of Trade in February 1823, he office did not carry with it entry into he Cabinet ; entry was not secured ntil nine months later. To-day the resident is automatically a member of he Cabinet. This change in constitu- onal practice is in part a tribute to Huskisson's work.

W. H. JOHNSTON

NTRODUCTION TO POLITICS, by Dorothy M. Pickles. *Sylvan Press*. 12*s*. 6*d*.

Mrs. Pickles has written an attractive nd useful book. Its title accurately ndicates its range and intention. This an introductory volume, meant for tudents who are interested in politics ut have not grounded themselves in the lassical writings on the subject. It as three purposes—to stimulate thought nd discussion, to help in distinguishing etween the permanent issues and the phemeral ones, and finally to provide imping off places for people who wish o go more deeply into the problems that sketches. Mrs. Pickles has been strikingly successful in her three objectives—largely because, although the book covers fairly familiar ground, it has been thought out afresh, is written attractively and draws its illustrations from novel and up-to-date contexts. A book of this sort competes in a field already extensively cultivated, but these qualities should give it a peculiar appeal and guarantee it wide usefulness.

With Mrs. Pickles' analysis of " Man and the State ", which deals both with the internal and the external problems of government, one can have little quarrel ; in balance and fairness it is admirable. One minor point, however, caught my eye. Aristotle is quoted as stating that government was first formed " that we might live, but continued that we may live happily." In choosing to render in this way an apothegm which is more normally translated " but continued that we may live well ", Mrs. Pickles is perhaps revealing the one limitation which her approach imposes on her. She is not to be blamed if in a book of 200 pages she has been unable to relate the problems of political philosophy to the issues of moral philosophy with which they are so inescapably bound up. Indeed in a chapter on " Rights and Duties ", Mrs. Pickles makes it clear that she is keenly aware of the moral obligations which a modern democracy imposes on its citizens. Nevertheless if there is an unsatisfactory element in her treatment it is a certain disposition to reduce the moral problems of politics to a merely external clashing of discrepant individual wills. Thus for example, in the second half of the book, which traces in an often stimulating way, the relationship between man and his fellow citizens, she seems sometimes to provide too superficial a diagnosis of the malady of modern democracies—the plight of the little man in a big State. " The idea of neighbourliness " which is advocated as one of the cures for this sickness is attractive only so long as it springs from a spontaneous and creative instinct of community. But it is precisely this which is lacking in a mass industrial

democratic society where the citizen has been reduced to a cog in the social machine. To stimulate "neighbourliness" under these circumstances is at best to invite the sheep to huddle together for a little deceptive warmth, and at worst to encourage that invasion of privacy which is one of the most debasing features of modern urban society. The problem which this type of solution merely trifles with can only be met by a much more radical cure—a cure addressed to the invalid not as citizen but as man. It is the problem of personality; it is the tawdriness of the average citizen's private life which makes his social and political existence such a pathetic search after security and mass satisfaction. In other words a first-class State cannot be built out of second-rate men. There is a point beyond which civic virtue, however admirable, cannot pass. The individual can only get a limited amount of nourishment from his society. The rest must come from that neglected source within himself.

H. G. NICHOLAS

IRISH NATIONALISM AND BRITISH DEMOCRACY, by E. Strauss. *Methuen.* 21*s.*

The Irish Republic is in the political doldrums. Her problems are like those of most other countries to-day—such things as the cost of living, the balance of trade and social services—but these do not greatly agitate the public conscience or provoke enthusiasm. It is those events which closely concern personalities and localities that make political news. Our crises since the end of the war have risen around bacon factories, distilleries and sub-post offices. True, there was Dr. Browne's Mother and Child Bill. But the mothers and children seemed to arouse less interest than the hagglings of the doctor, his cabinet colleagues and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Incidentally, the mothers and children are still no better off and few people worry.

There is, of course, partition. A few days after the British General Election a mass meeting was held in O'Connell Street, Dublin, to celebrate the return of the Nationalist candidates in Northern Ireland. The victorious anti-partitionists themselves were there and boomed their triumph through the loudspeakers at an audience hardly of "mass" proportions. Most of Dublin's citizens seemed to be at or going to the pictures. It looks as though that particular horse runs no faster at home than at Hyde Park Corner.

With Mr. de Valera's Fianna Fail party in office stagnation is more marked than before. Mr. Costello's *mixum gatherum* Government was, in the nature of things, unpredictable and anything might, and occasionally did, happen. To-day there is not even that hope and the Dail discusses parish pumps and economics with almost equal apathy. There is simply nothing to get excited about. The blame for this stagnation can be placed variously. Ireland cut herself off from international affairs by neutrality in wartime and, later, by refusing to have anything to do with the Atlantic Treaty. For apathy in internal affairs some say the reactionary attitude of the Roman Catholic Church is responsible—"if the Bishops want it done they'll say so; if they don't want it it can't be done." Or, perhaps, the men in politics are to blame for all. They are indeed an uninspired and uninspiring collection.

Those who read Mr. Strauss's book may be persuaded to find the cause elsewhere and to say that Ireland's apathy is the inevitable result of deprivation of her historic focus of interest, the British connection. They may also, from another point of view, see that Britain suffered no little deprivation, not in her pride or her pocket, but politically by the breaking of that connection. For Mr. Strauss succeeds remarkably well in demonstrating not only the effect on Ireland of British rule but also the reciprocal effect of Irish reaction to that rule on British home and empire politics. To say that the commonwealth concept as we have it to-day is largely, if uncon-

sciously, an Irish concept is not more an exaggeration than to say that the Irish question played a major part in shaping the modern British political scene. Which latter proposition Mr. Strauss appears to demonstrate very well.

The book, while maintaining its thesis of the interplay of Irish nationalism and British democracy, succeeds also in presenting an account of the social history of Ireland in the nineteenth century and could be read for this alone. Ireland has still to find a Trevelyan but, until she finds one, this work fills a need and fills it well. The present reviewer regrets that the author has succumbed to the fashion of collecting his references at the end of the book. Footnotes come more easily in the reader.

Mr. Strauss is an Austrian and perhaps that accounts for some involved and ponderous writing. But we must not expect to have it every way and his style may be forgiven for his lack of bias. He deals faithfully with Ireland's wrongs but no Irishman could have dealt with them so dispassionately. And it is regrettably unlikely that any Englishman would have bothered to deal with the subject at all.

F. A. G. WILLIS

HUMANITY AND DEITY, by Wilbur Marshall Urban. *Allen and Unwin.* 25*s.*

THE PRESENCE OF THE KINGDOM, by Jaques Ellul. *S.C.M. Press.* 9*s.* 6*d.*

Professor Urban has written a book which is sure to attract the attention of thinkers whose interest lies on the borderland of philosophy and religion, and his main concern is to re-establish a genuinely rational philosophy of religion. That attempt implies steering a middle course somewhere between that is rapidly becoming the conventional neo-orthodoxy of our time, and a liberalism which tends to dissolve religion into pure philosophy, especially scientific philosophy. There is moreover a third party, or rather, type of religion which he has in view—the simple piety of the man who, having faith, believes that he needs no more.

What Professor Urban presents us with in the end is an axiological religious philosophy. This, he believes, is a form of religious philosophy which underpins simple faith and gives to religion a sound basis in rational philosophy. It is, in a word, fundamentally a philosophy of value. It is impossible to start religious reflection from the idea of pure Being for pure Being, as Hegel said, is pure nothingness. It is only when Being, is seen to have Value as inherent in itself that it becomes a really fruitful notion at all. To the charge of subjectivism so frequently made against this type of religious philosophy Professor Urban's answer is twofold. On the one hand the axiological premise is there in Aquinas and Anselm and many other great Christian doctors and, secondly, values and " facts " are on exactly the same footing. We do not make them ; we simply find them, and the real argument for their objective existence is not that they make a world neatly fashioned according to our wishes, but that without them the meaning of the world as we know it would not be.

Working with this axiological interpretation of reality Professor Urban is able to give us both solid assurance that by rational argument we can rise to the conception of God and he gives us an illuminating criticism of the classical arguments for God based upon it. The language in which such rational argument is cast is, and must be, symbolical. Our own human experience alone can interpret to us the things of God but it can never tell us the whole truth. In that regard religion is on exactly the same footing as science for, as the author shows, science itself is symbolical and uses symbolic expressions to describe both its aims and its methods. That recognition of the limits common to both science and religion enables him to state their true relationships with unusual attractiveness and force. Scientists as well as theologians and philosophers will find here much to

challenge their unthinking. It is a fine, fresh book and it is to be doubted whether we have received so thorough a piece of philosophical and religious thinking from America for more than a generation.

Professor Ellul's book is of a very different kidney. It speaks essentially the language of faith and, what is more, of militant faith. The phrase "no compromise" is written on every page of it. It is born out of tragedy—the world's tragedy and the Christian's. Its background is the deep need of practical revolution to make justice and brotherhood a reality, and the frustration and suffering which spring from the fact that, at the present level of thought and practice in western civilization, neither of them can be achieved. The tragedy is no less the Christian's. The genuine Christian has in him the seeds of a new life which is essentially revolutionary but, alas, the Christian has succumbed, not to the Biblical but to the sociological and anthropological interpretations of human nature and its possibilities. "Their inner impulse (the impulse of true revolution) seems to have faded away and . . . Christians usually act as sociological beings. They seem to be unaware of their Christian freedom." The book is mainly concerned therefore with clarifying the objectives and the means of true Christian faith and of the ways in which the newer and truer Christianity can be communicated to others. We need, the author declares, a new style of living both as individual Christians and as churches.

The black and white of cold judgment can hardly do justice to a slim little volume which glows and burns with an intense spiritual fire and heat which is all too rare nowadays. It is a fine plea for action based upon Biblical faith and one's admiration for the book is hardly tempered by the wish that Professor Ellul had been a little clearer as to what Bible it is whose faith he desires Christians both to follow and to obey.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT

ISLAM: BELIEFS AND PRACTICES, by A. S. Tritton. *Hutchinson's University Library.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Doctor Tritton's book is an encyclopaedia of Islamic fact compressed within an extraordinarily small compass. Tabloided history normally betrays its limits by being either unreadable or incomprehensible or both. But Doctor Tritton has brilliantly overcome the problem of tabloidization—if I may use so dreadful a word. His book is not only informative and readable but it is arresting and, in places, highly entertaining. I quote one deliciously phrased comment: "In some ways the Khariji conscience is very tender; if you find a fig lying under a fig tree, the correct thing is to pin the fig to the tree."

The scope of the book covers the complete story of the Islamic faith and its history. The tale of Mohamed's mission and of the writing of the Koran and of the establishment of Moslem ritual and doctrine leads on to an analysis of Moslem beliefs and their evolution and of Moslem law and customs and their origin. Then after two intensely interesting and enlightening chapters on the Islamic sects and their characteristics and differences and, secondly, on mysticism, the author explains the organization of the Moslem State and the principles of Moslem social life and the growth of the modern movements in Islam. And having given us this background, he turns, in Chapter XI, to the innate strength of Islam as a factor in the life of every Moslem. His conclusions are brilliantly phrased and most pungent; and as there are over two hundred million Moslems in the world, the reality of their faith is to-day—perhaps as never before—a factor of crucial importance in world politics. For Islam is profoundly powerful and alive over about one-third of the world's land-surface. Doctor Tritton quotes: "To the Moslems religion is a reality, not to be assumed with Levitical attire, but part of their daily life." Again: "The Moslem is sure that his faith will

give him bliss in this world and in the next." Finally, there is the tremendous fact of Allah which is illustrated by the Koranic assertion that : " He is nearer to man than the vein in his neck." Doctor Tritton's conclusions (Chapter XI) can and should be read again and again.

Those of us whose lives and work have been in the Moslem world will close the book with regret that it was not written 20 or 30 years ago. Then Moslem feeling in the Middle East and Africa, in India and Indonesia was beginning to surge with ever-growing impetus towards emancipation. But, if I may use a commonplace, " better late than never. " There is still a big British rôle to be played in Moslem lands. And now Doctor Tritton has given those who will play it, a book from which those of us of older vintages would have greatly benefited in our day. We are further indebted to Dr. Tritton for an excellent index.

OWEN TWEEDY

SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, by James A. Williamson. *Collins.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

A new series of ' Brief Lives ' could hardly find a more attractive title for its first volume. As well as being a great historical figure in a stirring age, Drake has always been a legend to Englishmen. Mr. Williamson succeeds in the task of separating fact from fancy without dispersing the legendary glow in Drake's career.

Three main feats have placed Drake on the pinnacle which he shares with Nelson alone among English sailors—his voyage round the world, his raid on Cadiz where he " singed the King of Spain's beard " and the rout of the Armada. All these are vividly described with a model freshness and simplicity. Later generations have often wondered why Lord Howard of Effingham and not Drake was in supreme command against Philip of Spain's great fleet in 1588. Here the reason is made clear—" Drake would not have been obeyed . . he was self-made, self-reliant, no seeker of advice, no follower of fixed plans." He had Nelson's capacity for reading awkward signals with a blind eye. His triumphs in the Spanish Main had aroused envy as well as admiration among his fellow captains, and in an age when our notions of naval discipline and subordination did not exist tradition required the presence of a great nobleman rather than the genius of a fighting sailor. *El Draque* inspired panic in Spanish hearts, even far inland, and the rabble chanted his name under the windows of the house where the unhappy Medina Sidonia lay sick on his return. He would have inspired even more terror among the sombre file-readers of Whitehall, and it is interesting to notice in two ' Lives ' which have appeared recently how both Beatty and Keyes fretted in administrative posts after proving themselves authentic sons of Drake at sea. There is a spirit of independence necessary to great sailors which makes an office a poor anchorage.

Mr. Williamson does not shrink from the task of showing what a sad anti-climax were the last eight years of Drake's life. A biographer might well wish that he had died in the hour of victory, like Nelson, instead of surviving his triumphs, like Marlborough, to face discouragement in a world which he had so nearly conquered. Many will think that the last two pages of this book are the best. They contain a fine summary of what Drake did for English sea-power—not creating it (no man did that)—but shaping it by his daring into a bright, offensive weapon, and teaching Europe to see His Most Catholic Majesty as " a colossus stuffed with clouts. " He put a flame into the hearts of Englishmen on the sea : " War-hardened men were sure that they heard Drake's Drum beating loud as the Kaiser's fleet came in to surrender in 1918." Surely it was heard again in the summer of 1940, over the narrow sea between Dover and Dunkirk, when that fantastic armada was manned and captained by a thousand Drakes ?

RUPERT MARTIN

JOHN GERARD : The autobiography of an Elizabethan. Translated from the Latin by Philip Caraman. *Longmans.* 18*s.*

John Gerard was born in Lancashire in 1564, the son of Sir Thomas Gerard, a devout Roman Catholic : his education, begun in England, was continued in France and completed in Rome by his ordination to the priesthood and his admission to membership of the Society of Jesus. In 1588 he was ordered back to England by his superiors to work for the counter-Reformation or " English mission ". Then after 18 arduous and perilous years he was ordered back to Rome to train others for the mission he had left and this autobiography was written primarily (and again to order) for the instruction of his pupils.

Of necessity, Gerard's life and work were clandestine, from his secret landing on the Norfolk coast to his eventual return to what was always his true home. His birth gave him a ready access to and a natural background in the houses of the gentry who had remained faithful to the Papacy and he moved from one to another of these, publicly a layman of the upper classes, secretly a priest and a Jesuit. His was one of the lives of the hunted ; usually under suspicion and frequently in hiding, he had many a narrow escape before and after being arrested, tried and imprisoned in the Tower where he was tortured in a vain attempt to make him give information. He tells his story simply and humbly ; an apparent touch of complacency here and there is in fact the natural attitude of one who serves an authority infallibly right ; and he is markedly free from any bitterness.

The book is of considerable interest from several angles. To the contemporary Roman Catholic it can but bring pride in a hero of the faith ; to the ordinary reader who has heard in a vague way of secret missions, " priest's holes" and the like, it will bring a new reality ; to the student of history the copious appendices and carefully documented notes will be of considerable value. Of Gerard's deep piety, devotion to duty and utter disregard of self there can be no question. Here, indeed, is a dedicated life, yet there is also something frightening in this revelation of what is to-day called a conditioned mind which sees everything in stark black and white and is incapable of asking any questions. To Gerard, whatever is ordered or allowed by his own authorities is utterly and absolutely right ; the other side is *a priori* no less utterly and absolutely wrong. Nobody would expect of him a hesitating loyalty, but a more understanding attitude would be quite consistent with an equally uncompromising one.

Again, he protests repeatedly and sincerely his work has nothing to do with politics, yet any man thinking for himself knew that, at a higher level, immense political issues were involved in the religious struggle ; nor does his own simple acceptance of persecution include any hint that the victim of to-day was the sinner of yesterday. The sub-title : " The Diary of an Elizabethan " is true in point of time, but his mind, allegiance and aspirations were remote from those of England in the reign of Elizabeth and although born here Gerard returned essentially a foreigner.

JOHN HALET

SHAKESPEARE and ELIZABETHAN POETRY, by M. C. Bradbrook. *Chatto and Windus.* 16*s.*

Miss Bradbrook, a Fellow of Girton and a Lecturer in English at Cambridge, has already a reputation as an Elizabethan scholar. She is therefore unduly modest when in the preface to this study of Shakespeare's earlier work in relation to the poetry of the time, she speaks of the picture that she has here drawn as " rough and crude " and seeks justification for " my platitudes or my howlers." She herself supplies the evidence of her qualifications by her thirty-two page apparatus of notes in which she shows her intimate

familiarity with the ambit of Elizabethan critical studies on both sides of the Atlantic. And in her commentary she ranges for illustrations of her dicta from Lucretius and Virgil to W. B. Yeats, T. S. Eliot and Katherine Mansfield, besides drawing upon the sister arts in Van Eyck and Velasquez and Wagner.

In her introductory chapter Miss Bradbrook discusses some of the broader features of the relation between medievalism and the Renaissance. It has recently become the fashion to emphasize the links between them, but she claims that "the differences are as important as the likenesses, since they make up the rich and fecund welter of Elizabethan life, thought, and language." As the centre of the Court poetry was the queen herself, and Miss Bradbrook quotes relevantly from Spenser, Sidney and others. But, in my opinion, she should, on stylistic evidence, credit the prophetic lines about Elizabeth's reign in *Henry VIII* not to Shakespeare but to Fletcher. Allied to this court poetry is what Miss Bradbrook, in one of her earlier interesting chapters, calls "the Ovidian Romance". Here she discusses in turn Lodge's *Scilla's Metamorphosis*, Marlowe's *Hero and Leander*, and Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*. Of the two latter she says epigrammatically: "The delightful bravura of Marlowe's mocking wit was all-pervasive; but Shakespeare still had some heavy provincial Warwickshire loam sticking to his boots." She shows discrimination in claiming for Chapman's continuation of *Hero and Leander* that it has an emblematic and enamelled beauty of its own." She might have pointed out that T.H.'s (doubtless Thomas Heywood's) *Oenone and Paris* is the first known imitation of *Venus and Adonis*.

In his early poetry and plays Shakespeare affected in part the patterned, rhetorical style, then in fashion. But he broke away from it, as Miss Bradbrook points out, especially in the matter of vocabulary. "His achievement depends before all else on the power, range and strength of his use of words." The shift can be seen by contrasting the style of *Richard III* with *Richard II*. The earlier style is characteristic of *Titus and Andronicus* and *the Rape of Lucrece*. It is one of the most valuable features of Miss Bradbrook's study that she devotes so much attention to these and other of the less popular of Shakespeare's works. She finds in the tragedy and the poem what she calls a 'heraldic' quality, linking them together, while in *Titus* she sees anticipated some of the elements of *Lear*, and in the soliloquies of Tarquin "a first cartoon for the study of *Macbeth*." She does not accept fully the view that has been lately stressed that Shakespeare's history plays are designed with a moral purpose to illustrate the evils springing from civil strife. If so, there would have been no sufficient reason for the introduction of a Falstaff. *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* is another, in her view, undervalued play which prefigures the greater comedies. For Miss Bradbrook's interpretation of these, with their "polyphonic music", students will do well to go to her own pages, not as a "bedside book", but one which will repay their alert attention by stimulus (if not always assent) and illumination.

F. S. BOAS

ENGLISH LITERARY CRITICISM: 17th and 18th Centuries, by J. W. H. Atkins. *Methuen.* 21*s.*

At a first glance Professor Atkins's enterprise and achievement in this volume appear almost staggeringly ambitious; especially since he has already done for the criticism of antiquity and of the Renaissance what he now does for the later period. To assess the general development of critical writing and examine each critic's personal contribution might well be the task of a super-brain. It is with relief and no reproach that we find the structure to be in some measure a prefab. There is no secret about this. Both in his preface and abundantly in

his textual notes the author acknowledges his debt to those who have already marshalled sections of his material, and so enabled him to work concisely from more limited sources that supply him with selections and decisions ready-made. So we find him, for example, drawing heartily on Professor Nicol Smith for Shakepearean criticism, on J. Spingarn for seventeenth century critical essays, and on W. P. Ker for the essays of Dryden. With these authorities he no more joins issue than a builder would in assembling the sections of his house.

To this extent, then, the present work is academic, scholarly, orthodox and unexceptionable. All these are admirable qualities in a text-book, but might be held inadequate for a labour of constructive research. As it happens, it would be equally unfair to minimize Professor Atkins's part in the matter as to magnify it. Besides some luminous comments on the detail he has taken a broad all-over view that establishes a general progress over his whole period and so puts a roof on the structure. Much of his argument and many of his conclusions are his own entirely, and seem usually to be borne out by the examples quoted from the period.

The seventeenth century is not, as we now judge criticism, an age of outstanding brilliance. Its virtue is in promise and expansion. Professor Atkins shows it struggling to break away from an arid allegiance to the neo-classical precepts of France (under which French critics too were growing restive). That it did emerge, through a dawning sense that the humanities ought to invade cold judgment, is the significant factor which, carrying on through the eighteenth century, leads up eventually to the aesthetic and personal critical values of the emergent Coleridge. The first stirrings of escape are seen in a number of writers little read today—though we ought to note Temple who decried the stultifying "modern craze for ridicule and burlesque." But it is Dryden who inevitably dominates an epoch that seems composed of dwarfs beside him. Loosening up the rigid conceptions of the classicists, he is the pivotal point of this whole survey. After him the way was open to psychology and the creative imagination; even though Addison, whose function was to popularize rather than to develop, still saw fancy and imagination as synonymous entities. That secondary distinction was left to the nineteenth century. Of Dryden Professor Atkins concludes significantly that his greatness lay in his own "native sensibility which made him keenly alive to artistic values", and that his "judgment . . . was of a supra-rational kind."

The ice, in fact, becomes a little thin here. How far, in our present wider knowledge of psychology, are we justified in basing such a survey on influence and development at all? How far is each critic independent of tradition? The answer is, perhaps, fifty-fifty. There may be over-much insistence on Longinus as a motive-force for the period; but Professor Atkins certainly presents a case for the growing enlightenment of Shakespeare criticism, till with Morgann on Falstaff (an essay that deserves a separate reprint) character and motive in a work of fiction are examined as never before, and a delicate critical instrument has been formed. Morgann finds not merely rules but rational judgment to be inadequate without sensibilities and a more than logical vision. This in 1777, the year Johnson began his Lives of the Poets, is, in its smaller field, as suggestive as anything the Great Cham uttered in a body of writings that to some have only placed him as the "high priest of classicism". Such, we may note, is not the view of Professor Atkins, who after some first-hand examination concludes that Johnson, if inclined to sanity rather than poetry, paved the way towards the new aesthetic that was to jettison all fixed external standards, and assess the work through the mind of its creator.

SYLVA NORMAN

Mr. BELUNCLE, by V. S. Pritchett. *Chatto & Windus.* 12*s.* 6*d.*
UP THE COUNTRY, by Brent of Bin Bin. *Angus & Robertson.* 12*s.* 6*d.*
JEZEBEL'S DUST, by Fred Urquhart. *Methuen.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

" One of the great comic creations of our time " is the publishers' claim for the first of these three novels, and since the author is Mr. V. S. Pritchett, one begins to read with respect. *Mr. Beluncle* is not the earliest essay in fiction of this excellent critic, but inevitably, if unreasonably, it is the critic's reputation that holds the mind. When such taste, such style have been shown, such a faculty of going to the heart of things, what may not be hoped for from a novel ?

Mr. Pritchett's *milieu* here, as in his short stories, is the English suburban middle-class. It is an area of life in which, the cynic might say, experience is too dull and the weather too damp ever to call up intimations of another world. Yet it is here, surprisingly, that there flourish best those odd growths, the dissenting religions. The Church of the Last Purification, Toronto, is Mr. Beluncle's latest fad of this kind. It furnishes one centre of interest ; the Beluncle family's quarrel, which is its stake in life, another ; the young Henry's burgeoning love affair, yet a third. But there are many more, gyrating around each other in this underworld of the spirit in which the author is so patently at home. Mr. Beluncle himself is a blend of booby and tyrant, owning as distant cousins Babbitt and Mr. Forster's Henry Wilcox. He exists improvidently, translating the edicts of Mrs. Parkinson's God into the pattern of his own eccentric life.

When the book is read, the last turn of speech noted, the last comparison admired, there remains the question why it disappoints. For disappoint it does, despite the poetic talent by which so often the sense is made to shine. Mr. Pritchett is an observer, not a moralist, and in many respects the way of the moralist is easier. Given a certain equipment, the mere fact of his intention may carry him through. Here one has the impression that Mr. Pritchett's original impulse has exhausted itself. Again, in creating Mr. Beluncle at two levels—the real, and the larger, more bizarre than life—he seriously overtaxes his resources. Falstaff emerges whole from such a synthesis ; Mr. Beluncle palpably does not.

For the run of English readers, the novel of the Australian outback has meant *The Fortunes of Richard Mahoney*; there have been others, but we have remembered them more for their likeness to each other than for themselves. The society they have depicted is one at the stage of adventure, and the adventure has dwarfed the protagonists. Australia, in short, has commonly been the hero of these novels. *Up the Country* maintains the family likeness, but in doing so loses nothing of its own quality. Births, loves, deaths, marrying and giving in marriage, balls, floods and bushrangers, are all encountered here. The catalogue may be typical, but the zest which goes to the telling is not. There is a clarity, a warmth, a vivid if unsubtle sense of life. *Up the Country* is not a new book, but it deserves to gain a host of new readers.

In another idiom, that of the Edinburgh working-class, is *Jezebel's Dust*. Bessie Hipkiss, a young housemaid, is happiest in her day-dreams, which are founded on cinema romance. She is not at heart a bad girl, but the Allied invasion of Scotland proves too much for her amenable temperament. She is seduced by a Polish officer, taken to wife by another, widowed by the progress of the war. When her happiness seems finally secured, her first lover makes a threatening reappearance. There are the materials of high tragedy in this squalid little story, but Mr. Urquhart chooses a less ambitious treatment. Possibly his instinct is a sound one. At all events he makes Bessie a probable character and achieves a persuasive picture of her life.

JOHN EALES

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

This month the pattern looks something like a map of the paths that link the general to the particular, the widespread plains to the solitary peaks, anonymity to fame.

Cunning fingers

Thus the natural starting-point is ENGLISH POPULAR ART by Margaret Lambert and Enid Marx (*Batsford.* 16*s.*). Though grouped under orderly headings, copiously illustrated and discussed with obvious enjoyment and unobtrusive erudition, the examples—in retrospect—come tumbling higgledy-piggledy to mind. Here among them are gingerbread-stamps, tombstones, marionettes, trade cards, weathervanes, teapots, chimneypieces, straw marquetry, toys, ballads and broadsides ; paintings —on walls, signs, Christmas cards, glass —and tinselled, appliquéd, silhouetted or embroidered pictures. Country crafts and craftsmen are dying out, yet by preserving their work for study there ought to be a fair possibility, as the authors suggest, that through future designers " some of the old individual qualities and delight in simple forms " may be regained.

Artist-craftsmen

Dr. Lambert and Miss Marx claim too that many " motives have filtered down from more sophisticated levels." And an immediate instance—of the glories of weaving—is provided by FRENCH TAPESTRIES : From the XIVth to the XVIIIth Centuries (also *Batsford.* 7*s.* 6*d.*). George Wingfield Digby, of the Victoria and Albert Museum, has written an " introduction " to this handsome picture book with " Notes on the Plates " which add up into quite an historical survey. From the great hangings of 1375—measuring 472 feet and 18 feet high—depicting St. John's vision of the Apocalypse, designed by the court painter, executed by the merchant-weaver of Paris, and now housed in the Angers *Museé des Tapisseries*, the distinguished story unfolds. The technical accomplishment of the Flemish weavers who installed their 60 looms close to the Gobelins dyeworks in the reign of Louis XIV, and the independent characteristics and reputation of the Beauvais workrooms, flourished until the outbreak of the French Revolution. In the nineteenth century the production of Beauvais " became increasingly devoted to tapestry for upholstery."

Academicians

In fact, it had become what the French so neatly call " *imagerie populaire* ". Many would have us believe that the term might equally apply to the situation of painting, sculpture and architecture in Britain which culminated in THE ROYAL ACADEMY (*Bell.* 15*s.*). However this may be, its secretary, Sir Walter R. M. Lamb, has produced a revised and enlarged edition of the useful book he published in 1935. Not only are chapters devoted to the presidencies, beginning with Reynolds', but the records of the schools, the library, the exhibitions, lists of members, the relevant extract from the Chantrey will, details of the Leighton fund, and the Instrument of Foundation (quoted in full) are some of the " household words" that nevertheless are but vaguely understood by the general public. Perhaps with something like defiance it is reported here that what could be seen of the pictures between and behind the loitering chatterers at the Private View on December 8 of the Winter Exhibition, " The First Hundred Years of the Royal Academy 1768-1868 ", was on the whole pleasing. Especially welcome were the Turners gathered from private and other collections. Much of the work one has naturally " grown out of ", and the absence of Romneys and Rossettis increased some disconcertment, but, to eyes grown strained and perplexed by

modern manifestations, the prospect of returning when the galleries are emptier promises refreshment—not soporific but anodyne.

Poetry for fun

For as Ogden Nash puts it in "Epstein, spare that Yule log!":

> . . . the mantelpiece contains
> The angular remains
> Of a later representative Picasso.
> There are circles, there are dots,
> There are corners, there are spots,
> There are modernistic snapshots of the city,

not one of the best poems (and this in many cases is their correct description) in FAMILY REUNION (*Dent.* 8*s.* 6*d.*). In answer to a request for a collection of his verses for and about the young, the poet said that he would rather "make a book for the family, which is a unit composed not only of children, but of men, women, an occasional animal, and the common cold." So he divides these pages into Part I "The Man is Father of the Child, but he never quite gets used to it"; Part II "Daddy, I Want a Pet for my Very Own"; Part III "Around the House, or, what parents think about when they aren't thinking about children", and the satire, the cloak of world weariness that he occasionally dons, does not disguise the kindly philosopher and the understanding adult whose criticisms are thereby incapable of destructiveness. More quotation is impossible—so up goes *Family Reunion* beside his *Versus* and *The Face is Familiar*, information that should be construed as cordial recommendation to read for yourself.

A dusty answer

Ogden Nash, it is unnecessary to state, does not figure among the other American poets, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Robert Frost, in THE BACKGROUND OF MODERN POETRY (*Bell.* 5*s.* 6*d.*). The urge to add "and more's the pity" is restrained, because J. Isaacs in these broadcast lectures now printed does make a sincere and profound plea for the importance, the authenticity, of the place the present custodians have in the tradition of innovation in English literature, which commands respect for if not unqualified assent to all his views. With his capable guidance we can see for ourselves how Spenser, Wordsworth, Marlowe, Keats or Shelley administered enough shocks to their contemporaries to qualify for the rôle of ancestors to "the moderns". We can even see that these could trace their technique to the metaphysical poets of seventeenth-century England and to the symbolists of France in the nineteenth. But what we are not reassured about is the ability of our middle-twentieth century practitioners to produce descendants. If their aim is T. S. Eliot's own, as quoted in the last paragraph of this book, who can be sure that poetry is not already dead, killed perhaps by science?

And, when Mr. Isaacs says that the chief and standard device Mr. E. has taught "modern poets is that method of incorporating a line from some other poet, or some other language, deftly converted, its license-plates so altered that its own proprietor would hardly recognize it," we cannot feel that it is one "to produce reverberations of meaning, and above all of feeling." Instead, we remember those people who used the jewels of Wilde's conversation to decorate their own bare offerings. In the November 1951 FORTNIGHTLY, Mr. Herbert Palmer quoted Dr. Edith Sitwell's 'incorporation' and now, as Mr. Isaacs cites:

> When lovely woman stoops to folly and
> Paces about her room again, alone,

smoothing her hair mechanically and putting a record on the gramophone, we yield to disappointment and despair that the pupils should so be given stones for bread.

Battles long ago

Mr. Isaacs quotes D. H. Lawrence's affirmations on "the essence of poetry" as he conceived it for his time, and Harry T. Moore in THE LIFE AND WORKS OF D. H. LAWRENCE (*Allen & Unwin.* 25*s.*) now explores, interprets

and assesses his range and influence as poet, novelist, essayist and painter. To one who, young when he died, was excited and stimulated by the work of the circle of people who moved about him, who still holds that his travel pieces were the ones that mattered most and who recalls undimmed the awesome morning in 1930 that brought the news of his death, this book is no raking over of ashes to find a spark, for it burns on its own account fresh and strong and clear. To one, moreover, who has read too much about him by enemies of Lawrence who called themselves his friends, it appears to be one of the fairest and fullest reckonings that will ever be made of that complex and controversial character. Mr. Moore will forgive and perhaps understand the dismay that greeted the announcement that his book " was submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Boston University Graduate School." Yet, informative and searching as it is, it has no smell of the lamp, and entirely lacks the portentousness that afflicts the writing of so many academic Americans.

Shaw's corner

One small bone is to be picked with him : after attending the press conference of the Bernard Shaw Memorial Appeal where the speakers, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Ivor Brown, Lady Astor, Mr. Felix Aylmer and Sir Lewis Casson, all testified to that cranky, cantankerous gentleman's ready generosity to young and struggling authors, I disliked Mr. Moore's interpolation " (the Morrells even persuaded George Bernard Shaw to make a small contribution) " when telling of the fund raised by Sir Edward Marsh and others to help the needy Lawrence. Fortunately the balance is redressed by A. C. Ward, who dedicates his book BERNARD SHAW (*Longmans.* 10*s.* 6*d.*) to this man " who taught me to do my own thinking " and says that he was " generous, though he detested ' charity ' because it was much used to disguise the evil injustice of poverty." In a chapter on " Shaw and the Contemporary Situation ", in one of biography, in " Fiction and Criticism " and in studies of the development as a playwright, the author starts a purposeful trickle of what is certain to become a flood of writing about thedead giant. It is unlikely that the full spate will produce any more complete or satisfactory estimate.

A ring of friends

Shaw himself finished the Preface to SALT AND HIS CIRCLE by Stephen Winsten (*Hutchinson.* 16*s.*) the night before his last accident, and figures throughout the book; he even corrected and advised on many of the references to himself, and there is a facsimile of a postcard vigorously phrased, and clearly written as ever, six months before his death. A witness at Shaw's wedding, Salt and he were truly intimates, but so were Salt and Meredith, and Swinburne, and Chesterton, Gandhi, W. H. Hudson, Olive Shreiner and a host of others. It is not surprising these people loved him ; though largely unknown by the world when he died in 1939 he was a true original—the product of Eton and Cambridge, dedicating his soul to humanitarianism, his mind and heart to the understanding of Shelley, Thoreau and Melville, his ready wit to the composition of verses of the quality that adorn each chapter of the book. When he was 90 he wrote his own admirable funeral address to " give the deceased the assurance that the words said at his cremation will be what he himself would have desired. He promises in turn to be brief . . ." A lively subject, Henry Salt, for Mr. Winsten, the lively observer.

GRACE BANYARD

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